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Disclosure Reform-The SEC Is Riding Off in
Two Directions at Once
By Roberta S. Karmel*
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") is being buffeted by dia-
metrically opposing forces with regard to disclosure policy rulemaking. The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 required the SEC
to pass rules to compel public companies to make disclosures about conflict minerals,
mine safety, and certain payments to foreign governments, all for the purpose of ad-
vancing societal goals. Proponents of sustainability metrics have been urging the
SEC to adopt standards relating to environmental and other similar matters, and a pe-
tition on disclosure of corporate contributions and lobbying expenses by public compa-
nies would involve the SEC in another political quagmire. Yet, forces that would dereg-
ulate disclosure mandates are also pressuring the SEC, and the JOBS Act of 2012
included some such deregulatory measures. Also, the SEC has embarked on its own
initiative for streamlining disclosure obligations. This article discusses these conflicting
disclosure initiatives and some of the current academic papers and theories with regard
to SEC disclosure policy. I suggest a few possible ways for the SEC to move forward,
including scaled and tiered disclosure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC" or "Commission") pri-
mary mandate is investor protection, and it implements this mandate by promul-
gating full disclosure standards for companies tapping the capital markets. Since
the 1980s, the same disclosure standards have applied to issuers making initial
public offerings ("IPOs") and to issuers providing information in annual and pe-
riodic reports required thereafter. Over the years, the almost-continuous criti-
cism of SEC disclosure policy has inspired efforts to study and reform disclosure
obligations. These criticisms and efforts have sometimes been at cross-purposes,
resulting in numerous changes and additions to SEC disclosure requirements
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that amount to information overload.' Currently, the SEC is subject to contradic-
tory pressures regarding its disclosure policies.
In the past, advancing societal good was an infrequent use of SEC disclosure
policy. One example is corporate disclosure about environmental infractions.
Today, however, some political players are attempting to use the federal securi-
ties laws to implement social policies to compel large multinationals to behave as
"good" corporate citizens. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank")2 required the SEC to pass rules mandat-
ing that public companies disclose their use of conflict minerals from the Congo
and directing certain companies to make disclosures about mine safety and pay-
ments to foreign governments for resource extraction.' These rules were contro-
versial because their purposes departed from traditional concerns for investor
protection. As a result, they were strongly opposed by businesses-some of
which successfully sued the SEC after the rules on conflict minerals and resource
extraction were passed. The SEC proposed revised rules regarding resource ex-
traction on December 23, 2015 .4 Other activists are advocating that public com-
panies disclose political contributions and metrics of sustainability. Two other
issues that could add new disclosures are whether the SEC should compel com-
panies to disclose the effects of climate change on their businesses and whether
the SEC should make cybersecurity risks a line-item disclosure requirement.
Pushing in the opposite direction from additive social responsibility dis-
closures are statutory mandates in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
("JOBS Act")5 to relieve small businesses of various disclosure obligations previ-
ously imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") 6 or Dodd-
Frank. In addition, the JOBS Act required the SEC to consider the disclosure re-
quirements of Regulation S-K to determine how to modernize and simplify
them.' Furthermore, the SEC itself has undertaken a project to review its disclo-
sure policies with a view to meeting some of the criticisms from investors and
academics that SEC disclosure documents are too lengthy, too prolix, and not
sufficiently helpful for making investment decisions.8 The conflicting disclosures
1. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Path Forward on Disclosure- Ad-
dress at the National Association of Corporate Directors Leadership Conference (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www. sec. gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806 thereinafter White, Path Forward].
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Star.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) thereinafter Dodd-Frank].
3. Dodd-Frank §§ 1502, 1503, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m & note, 78m-2 (2012).
4. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 76620, 80
Fed. Reg. 80058 (proposed Dec. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Star. 306 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) thereinafter JOBS Act].
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Star. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.) thereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
7. See JOBS Act § 108.
8. See Keith F. Higgins, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Div. of Corp. Fin., Disclosure Effective-
ness: Remarks Before the American Bar Association Business Law Section Spring Meeting (Apr. 11,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541479332 thereinafter Higgins, Dis-
closure Effectiveness]. Former SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman has asserted that disclosures
have become so complex they are "less than useful." Yin Wilczek, Former Commissioners Suggest Im-
provements to SEC Disclosure Regime, 46 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1489 (Aug. 4, 2014).
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that the banking authorities and the SEC impose on banks present completely
different problems.
9
It is difficult to predict how these conflicting political pressures will play out,
but if the past is prologue, the SEC will resist both efforts to increase or decrease
the disclosure burden of public companies unless new laws force it to do so. The
SEC's internal review of public disclosure requirements may clean up some of
the clutter in Regulations S-K and S-X, but it is unlikely to seriously streamline
SEC reporting. Attention to the conflicting pressures on the SEC with regard to
disclosure policy has compelled at least two suggested avenues for resolving the
conflicts.
One proposal is tiered disclosure, which would subject newer and smaller
public companies to fewer disclosure obligations, but large multinationals
would be required to make a greater number of disclosures, some of which relate
to sustainability. ° The JOBS Act has provided such a solution with regard to
some disclosure obligations for emerging growth companies ("EGCs"). Another
proposal would require companies to furnish sustainability and some other dis-
closures to the SEC, but not "file" them, thus relieving those companies of liabil-
ity for defective disclosures." Such a provision was debated with regard to some
of the Dodd-Frank disclosure obligations.12 Other ideas include scaled dis-
closure that would differentiate the needs of different investor groups 13 or access
for sophisticated investors to "pure" information, which is unfiltered by issuers
or other intermediaries. 14
Part II of this article reviews the SEC's disclosure framework and describes
some historical efforts to reform disclosure policies. Part III discusses some re-
cent political and social responsibility proposals for new disclosure require-
ments- however, governance and executive compensation proposals and disclo-
sures are not discussed, because these items have long been considered material
to investors. Part IV explains the deregulatory initiatives of the JOBS Act. Part V
describes the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance reform agenda, and Part VI
discusses some of the academic papers on these topics.
9. See Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes oj injormation: Banks, Innovation, and Diver-
gent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON RE G. 565,601-18 (2014) thereinafter Hu, Disclosure Universes].
10. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that
Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. LJ. 151, 194-96 (2013); Onnig H. Dombalagian,
Principles jor Publicness, 67 FLA. L. Rrv. 649 (2015).
11. See David B.H. Martin & Graham Robinson, To Be or Not to Be "Filed," INSIcHTS, Sept. 2003,
at 1.
12. See Conflict Minerals Update: Letter jrom Congress Indicates SEC Final Rule Is Imminent, AKIN
GuMp (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/conflict-minerals-update-
letter-from-congress-indicates-sec-final-rule-is-imminent.html thereinafter Conflict Minerals Update].
13. Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the "SEC Speaks" Conference
(Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spechckms.html.
14. See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Injormation," and the SEC Disclo-
sure Paradigm, 90 TEx. L. Rrv. 1601, 1606-13 (2012) thereinafter Hu, Too Complex].
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II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
A. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934
The drafters of the first federal securities law, the Securities Act of 1933 ("Se-
curities Act"),15 chose full disclosure over merit regulation as an investor protec-
tion technique. Full disclosure regulation is based on the often-quoted theory
that "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial dis-
eases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants- electric light the most effi-
cient policeman."16 The Securities Act therefore permitted any corporation to
make a public offering of its securities if it made full disclosure of its business
and affairs. To avoid congressional tinkering, a specified list of disclosure
items, including the provision of a profit and loss statement and balance
sheet, was attached to the Securities Act as Schedule A.17 According to one of
the Securities Act's drafters, this list was the "guts of the bill." '' Congress re-
quired that an independent public accountant certify financial statements filed
with the SEC but gave the SEC the power to prescribe the detail and content
of financial statements19 In addition, Congress authorized the SEC to define "ac-
counting, technical, and trade terms, used in this subchapter [and] to prescribe
the form .. in which required information shall be set forth, the items .. to be
shown in the balance sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be fol-
lowed in the preparation of accounts."20
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") 21 initially required
companies that made a Securities Act-registered public offering and companies
listed on a national securities exchange to make annual and periodic disclosures
to encourage sound investing.22 In 1964, amendments to the Exchange Act ex-
panded the universe of companies required to make annual and periodic reports
to include companies traded over-the-counter with $1 million in assets and
500 shareholders. 23 This metric was then expanded to include companies
with $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders, but in the JOBS Act, it was lim-
ited to companies with $10 million in assets and either 2,000 shareholders or
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012).
16. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa.
18. See DONALD A. RICHm IE JAMES M. LANDIS- DEAN O THE PiULATOs 47 (1980).
19. See Securities Act Schedule A, Items 25-27, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(27).
20. Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (2012).
22. See Exchange Act §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d).
23. See Hugh F. Owens, Comm'r, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm'n, Securities Acts Amendments of
1964: Address Before the Federal Securities Acts Seminar 5 (Nov. 20, 1964), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/1964/112064owens.pdf. At that time, all securities not traded on a national securities
exchange were over-the-counter securities and NASDAQ was not a national stock exchange. This re-
form was based on conclusions by the SEC in its Special Study of the Securities Markets that periodic
disclosure and other Exchange Act protections should be extended to all publicly traded issuers, not
only to issuers of exchange-listed securities, because of the correlation between lack of disclosure and
fraud. H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 3, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 8-10 (Apr. 3, 1963).
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500 shareholders who are not accredited investors. 24 The Exchange Act also re-
quired listed companies-and, after 1964, most publicly traded companies-to
make disclosures in their proxy solicitations in connection with their annual
meetings. 25
Until the early 1980s, the regulations for Securities Act registration statements,
Exchange Act annual and periodic reports, and proxy disclosures differed in
some significant respects. 26 In 1982, the SEC adopted its integrated disclosure
regulations. 27 Securities Act registration statements, Exchange Act annual and
periodic reports, and proxy solicitations all became subject to the same business,
operational, and financial statement disclosure requirements. These require-
ments are set forth in Regulation S-K28 and Regulation S-X.29 Regulation S-K
generally sets forth the substantive disclosures that public companies must
make about their businesses, operations, and governance structures, and Regu-
lation S-X sets forth rules for accounting statement presentation. Yet, the SEC has
delegated the formulation of accounting principles to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB") 30 by granting that the principles, standards, and prac-
tices the FASB promulgates have "substantial authoritative support" and by de-
nying such authoritative support to contrary promulgations 31 Thus, FASB stan-
dards are the only generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") used for
SEC reports.
Regulation S-K sets forth the requirements applicable to the content of the
nonfinancial portions of SEC-filed documents. It covers such matters as a de-
scription of the issuer's business and property, legal proceedings, securities of
the issuer, financial information, management and major securityholders, the
format of registration statements and prospectuses, industry guides, and special-
ized disclosure provisions for roll-up transactions, mergers and acquisitions,
asset-backed securities, and oil and gas producers. The detail of Regulation
S-K is staggering, but the concept of materiality qualifies the required disclo-
sures. Materiality is defined in SEC Rule 405 as follows: "The term material
when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is
24. See JOBS Act § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1).
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2015).
26. U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMMNN, RR REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE EQUIREMENTS IN REGULATON S-K 8
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf thereinafter
S-K REPORT].
27. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg.
11380 (Mar. 3, 1982).
28. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-1208 (2015).
29. Id. §§ 210.1-01-210.12-29.
30. Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-
Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, 68 Fed. Reg. 23333 (Apr. 25, 2003). This
delegation to the private sector dates back to 1938. Accounting Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg.
10912, 10913 (1938).
31. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and
Standards, Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973), 1973 WL 149263.
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a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security registered ."32
The line-item disclosures of Regulation S-K are mandated and do not depend
on an independent judgment by registrants as to their materiality. In addition,
Securities Act Rule 408 and Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 require that, in addition
to line-item compelled information, registrants must include such further mate-
rial information "as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of
the circumstances ... not misleading.
33
Tests of materiality in litigation are less straightforward. In Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 3 4 the Supreme Court stated that materiality is information that
"might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder" and then
added that the test of materiality requires "a significant propensity to affect" in-
vestors. 3 5 However, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 36 the Court held that
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."
3 7
Historically, the SEC generally has interpreted materiality to mean economic
materiality, but sometimes more qualitative measures have crept into SEC stan-
dards. One important example is the SEC's views regarding disclosure of corpo-
rate governance, beginning with the finding in In re Franchard Corp.38 that dis-
closure of management integrity is material and continuing with the SEC's many
required corporate governance disclosures concerning the composition of corpo-
rate boards and the independence of corporate directors. 39 Sarbanes-Oxley put
some of these disclosure requirements into statutory form and added new disclo-
sure requirements, such as requirements for codes of ethics, attestations by cor-
porate executives to financial statements, and an attestation of outside auditors to
a company's internal controls. 4 Some of these attestation requirements have
now been removed for certain EGCs, but they remain in force for large public
companies.
Recently, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board ("SASB") was orga-
nized as a private sector nonprofit to formulate standards for substantive disclo-
sure in SEC filings on sustainability issues regarding environmental, social, and
human capital- innovation- and governance. 41 SEC Commissioner Daniel Galla-
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2015) (emphasis added). Of relevance to this article, Item 1.03 requires
every environmental law penalty over $100,000 to be disclosed no matter how large the registrant.
Id. § 229.103.
33. Id. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20.
34. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
35. Id. at 384.
36. 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (involving omissions in a proxy solicitation).
37. Id. at 439.
38. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
39. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream oj William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange
Commission Takes Charge oj Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005) thereinafter Karmel,
Realizing the Dream].
40. See Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 404, 406 & 407, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7262, 7264 & 7265 (2012).
41. See SSTAIA B lTY AccOUNTNG STANDARDS BD., CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 7-8 (Oct. 2013) therein-
after CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK].
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gher attacked this effort as a third party's improper attempt to "prescribe what
should be in corporate filings," a task which is the SEC's responsibility. 42 Fur-
thermore, the SASB has been accused of broadening and misinterpreting the
meaning of materiality by asserting that its disclosure guidance could influence
decisions that users make concerning a reporting company. 4 Members of the
SASB pushed back against these criticisms, noting that both quantitative and
qualitative materiality must be considered under SEC regulations and auditing
standards. 
44
Current SEC disclosure regulations have become extremely complicated for a
variety of reasons, including changing business realities and new capital market
practices. Further, enforcement and private securities cases charging public com-
panies with fraud are invariably followed by the demands of regulated entities
and their lawyers for more specific disclosure requirements. Regulations S-K
and SX primarily embody the SEC's disclosure regime, but disclosure policies
are also scattered throughout SEC forms, interpretative releases, no-action let-
ters, and comment letters on SEC filings- and the courts have articulated them
in a variety of securities cases. A generalized materiality test used in antifraud
cases has given rise to multiple layers of specific instructions regarding disclo-
sure in SEC regulations and accounting and auditing rules. However, SEC
line-item disclosure mandates do not necessarily rise to the materiality level re-
quired in antifraud damages actions. 
4 5
In September 2015, the FASB proposed a new materiality standard for corpo-
rate financial disclosures. For decades, the test for materiality has been whether
the information could influence the decisions of prospective and current share-
holders. 46 The proposed standard would instead afford companies a higher de-
gree of discretion by aligning the FASB's definition of materiality with that of the
United State Supreme Court. 4 ' That standard, enunciated in cases such as Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 48 deems information to be material when a reasonable person is
likely to view it as significantly altering the "total mix" of facts about a company.4
9
The FASB stated in its proposal press release that the perceived need to align
its materiality standard with that of the Supreme Court was prompted by
42. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Federal Preemption of State Cor-
porate Governance: Address at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane University Law
School (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541315952.
43. See Samuel P. Gunther, Richard H. Murray & Sheila A. S. Gunther, The Securities Laws and the
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, 46 SEc REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 504, 506 (Mar. 17, 2014).
44. See Aulana L. Peters & Elisse B. Walter, As the World Turns, So Must Its Markets, 46 SEc RE. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1837, 1838 (Sept. 22, 2014).
45. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec Litig., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).
46. See Gretchen Morgenson, FASB Proposes to Curb What Companies Must Disclose, N.Y. Tms (Jan. 2,
2016), http://www.nytimes.coVm2016/01/03/business/fasb-proposes-to-curb-what-companies-must-
disclose.html?_r 0.
47. See Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Disclosure Framework Exposure
Drafts on Materiality (Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document-C/
DocumentPage&cid 1176166402203.
48. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
49. Id. at 232.
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stakeholder complaints about the inconsistency between the two standards and
the resultant unpredictability surrounding organizations' potential interpretation
of materiality. 5° The FASB further explained that adopting the Supreme Court's
standard provides all companies (public, private, nonprofits, and employee ben-
efit plans51 ) with the "appropriate use of discretion. "52 Discretion, the FASB pos-
its, will reduce the amount of immaterial information disclosed, making financial
disclosures easier for investors to understand and interpret. 
53
Nevertheless, the securities industry has heavily criticized the proposal, whose
opponents argue that more discretion for companies means less disclosure of in-
formation to investors. 54 Moreover, critics argue that by rendering the standard
entirely legal in nature, it will relegate to lawyers disclosure decisions on ac-
counting matters, which should be within the purview of accountants.
5 5
B. POLICY SHIFTS IN DISCLOSURE POLICY
SEC disclosure policy has long been subject to serious controversies, includ-
ing debates about the appropriate balance between disclosure directed at insti-
tutional investors and disclosure for retail investors, the disproportionate bur-
dens of disclosure obligations on smaller companies, and the extent to which
SEC disclosure policy should serve as a prophylactic for improving corporate
governance and corporate conduct generally. These debates seem to break out
with greater force when scandals in the business world erode public confidence
in large corporations. The 2008 financial meltdown has evoked extreme political
partisanship and confusion as to how the SEC should react to restore investor
confidence and encourage capital formation. Nevertheless, over the years, the
SEC has steadily focused on improving disclosure regulation and the offering
process.
In the late 1960s, SEC Commissioner Frank Wheat led an influential policy
study, the Wheat Report, 56 much of which was aimed at making private place-
ments easier and reducing the likelihood that they would be challenged after the
fact by recommending rules for such transactions. These recommendations led
to a spate of subsequent rulemaking to make the offering process more effi-
cient. 57 Efforts to further improve disclosure and offering regulations continued
50. Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Disclosure Framework Exposure Drafts
on Materiality 2 (Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.fasb.org/sp/FASB/Document C/DocumentPage&cid
1176166402203.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Letter from Sanford Lewis, Counsel, Inv'r Envt Health Network, to Susan M. Cosper,
Tech. Dir., Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://goo.glI/Q9PazR.
55. See Morgenson, supra note 46.
56. Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34
Acts, SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N HIST. 5oc'¥ (Mar. 27, 1969), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum
galleries/tbi/gogo-d.php.
57. These efforts culminated in the promulgation of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508
(2015).
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into the 1970s when the SEC organized the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure, which recommended simplifying disclosure policies. 58 In particular,
the Advisory Committee recommended the single integrated disclosure system9
which was adopted in the early 1980s.
Yet, the SEC's sensitive payments cases in the mid-1970s 60 set off a clamor for
more exacting regulation of public companies. The SEC reacted by holding hear-
ings on corporate governance around the country6 ' and then adopting some new
corporate governance disclosure obligations, including disclosures about the in-
dependence of directors 62 and new rules concerning management remuneration
and undisclosed perquisites. 63
SEC disclosure policy then was altered by globalization of the capital markets
and a large influx of foreign companies into the U.S. capital markets and the SEC
disclosure system. The Commission was forced to consider different disclosure
regimes in Europe and elsewhere, as well as possible harmonization of U.S.
and international accounting regulations. 64 Although the capital markets and
disclosure policies grew ever more complex, various task forces and advisory
committees recommended modernizing and simplifying the offering process
and post-IPO disclosure by registrants. 65
In 1992, the SEC adopted an integrated disclosure system for small business
issuers. 66 Later, in the late 1990s, the SEC imposed a "Plain English" policy on
SEC filings. 67 This policy was aimed at retail investors at a time when institu-
tional investors were opting out of the SEC disclosure regime by turning to
the private placement markets .68 Well-known seasoned issuers ("WKSIs")
58. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DSCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (1977).
59. See id.
60. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 1976).
61. See Re-examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participa-
tion in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release
No. 13901, 42 Fed. Reg. 44860 (Sept. 7, 1977).
62. See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Pro-
cess and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58522
(Dec. 14, 1978) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274).
63. See Uniform and Integrated Reporting Requirements: Management Remuneration, Securities
Act Release No. 6003, 43 Fed. Reg. 58181 (Dec. 13, 1978); Disclosure of Management Remunera-
tion, Securities Act Release No. 6166, 44 Fed. Reg. 74808 (Dec. 18, 1979).
64. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FoRrHAM INT'L L. 1692 (2008); Roberta
S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33
STETSON L. REv. 849, 855-56 (2004).
65. See, e.g., REPORT O THE TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSU SIMPLIFICATION (Mar. 5, 1996), www.sec.gov./
news/studies/simpl.htm.
66. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36442 (July 30, 1992)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249 & 260).
67. Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Jan. 28, 1998)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239 & 274).
68. See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition oj an Accredited Investor,
39 RUTGERS L.. 681 (2008).
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were insisting on more streamlined registration procedures, and in 2005 the SEC
responded with new and complicated rules on public offering procedures. 69
The bursting of the 1990s technology bubble and the Enron and WorldCom
scandals turned the SEC back to domestic problems and the need to implement
the rulemaking mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley. Shortly thereafter, the SEC con-
fronted new and more difficult challenges stemming from the 2008 financial melt-
down. Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010 to prevent the meltdown from reoccur-
ring, but before the Commission was able to fully implement its rulemaking and
complete the tasks assigned by Dodd-Frank, in 2012 Congress passed the JOBS
Act, substituting deregulation for the added regulatory thrust of Dodd-Frank.
This brief, incomplete history of SEC disclosure reforms suggests that the
forces buffeting the SEC today are part of a recurring pattern of reformers calling
for deregulation and simplification of SEC disclosures while other reformers call
for public companies to make more extensive disclosures-particularly those
designed to change corporate conduct-and prevent past disclosure failures
from reoccurring. In this tug-of-war, advocates for small business are often
able to accomplish deregulation, and large multinational companies and institu-
tional investors are often able to opt out of SEC registration requirements
through exemptions and special rules. In the process, a bifurcation has devel-
oped in the securities markets between truly public markets and private markets,
and a divide may be growing between the disclosure requirements imposed on
large public companies and those imposed on smaller companies. Perhaps that
would not be such a bad result, but it would not lead to greater simplification of
the offering and disclosure regimes. ° Further, the relaxation of Exchange Act
registration requirements by the JOBS Act may create a class of quasi-public
companies not subject to SEC disclosure regulation.
III. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE
A. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
When the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")7 1 was passed in 1969,
the SEC had no disclosure requirements regarding corporate environmental pol-
icy. However, the NEPA instructed all government agencies to interpret and ad-
minister their laws in such a way as to protect the environment.72 Two years
later, the National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") filed a rulemaking pe-
tition to require the SEC to include information about the environmental impact
69. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722 (July 19,
2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249 & 274).
70. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Reg-
ulation Ajter the JOBS Act, 101 GEo. LJ. 337 (2013); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort,
Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. RrV. 1573
(2013).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 45321-45347 (2012).
72. See id. § 4332.
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of corporate activities." Initially, the SEC did not change its reporting require-
ments. Instead, the Commission issued a release calling attention to existing pro-
visions concerning how an issuer described its business, as those requirements
related to material matters involving the environment. The Commission noted
that registered issuers must disclose material legal proceedings involving envi-
ronmental matters.
7 4
The NRDC was dissatisfied with this response and sued the SEC in federal
court in the District of Columbia to compel the Commission to require public
companies to disclose
with respect to each major activity or product: (1) the nature and extent ... of
the resulting environmental pollution... ; (2) the feasibility of reducing such pol-
lution... ; (3) the prospects for improving that technology, (4) existing and pro-
jected expenditures for reducing such pollution... ; (5) legal requirements affecting
the impact on the environment of the registrant's activities... , and (6) pending or
threatened judicial or agency proceedings, whether initiated by private or govern-
mental bodies, challenging the registrant's compliance with environmental protec-
tion standards
7 1
This litany of requirements went far beyond the SEC's traditional concept of eco-
nomic materiality, but the SEC subsequently issued a new release on environmen-
tal disclosure requiring the issuer's business description to disclose the material
effects that compliance with environmental laws might have on the company's cap-
ital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position. 76 The SEC also mandated
disclosure of any administrative or judicial environmental proceeding "known to
be contemplated by governmental authorities. "'
7 7
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the SEC had vi-
olated the Administrative Procedure Act in promulgating this release and noted
that the SEC was required to interpret the securities laws in accordance with the
NEPA's stricture to protect the environment "to the fullest extent possible."78 On
remand, the SEC determined that disclosure regulations under the securities laws
are limited to information of an economic nature and that the agency was not
required to embrace a broader disclosure because of the NEPA .7  Although
73. See Environmental Disclosure Rules: Despite Court Win, SEC Adopts Broad New Standard jor Cor-
porations, ENVTL. L. REP. (Dec. 1979), http://elr.info/news-analysis/9/l0222/environmental-disclosure-
rules-despite-court-win-sec-adopts-broad-new-standard-corporations thereinafter Environmental Dis-
closure Rules].
74. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities Act
Release No. 5170, 36 Fed. Reg. 13989 (July 29, 1971) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231 & 241).
75. Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'g 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C.
1974); Environmental Disclosure Rules, supra note 73.
76. Disclosure with Respect to Compliance with Environmental Requirements and Other Matters,
Securities Act Release No. 5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12100 (May 9, 1973) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
239 & 249).
77. Id. at 12101.
78. Natl Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 1974).
79. See Notice Of Commission Conclusions and Final Action on the Rulemaking Proposals An-
nounced in Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975) Relating To Environmental Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 12414, 9 S.E.C. Docket 540 (May 27, 1976), 1976 WL 160388.
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the lower court once again disagreed with the SEC, the D.C. Circuit Court, focus-
ing on the SEC's sphere of discretion, affirmed the SEC's views on appeal and
held that the NEPA did not require the SEC to pass specific disclosure rules. 8
Despite the SEC's initial reluctance to go beyond a standard economic mate-
riality analysis with regard to environmental disclosures, the agency did take ac-
tion both in enforcement cases and rulemaking. Only six months after its victory
over the NRDC, the SEC issued an order finding that four years of periodic re-
ports filed by U.S. Steel Corporation with the SEC failed to comply with the
SEC's environmental disclosure regulations.81 Simultaneously, the SEC issued
an interpretative release announcing new standards for environmental disclo-
sures 82 The release required issuers to disclose the costs of compliance with en-
vironmental protection laws and all administrative proceedings pending or con-
templated by regulatory authorities, regardless of whether the amount of money
involved was material. s 3
Almost immediately, the SEC had second thoughts about such disclosures and
proposed amendments requiring disclosure of "all environmental proceedings,
including governmental proceedings, which are material to the business or fi-
nancial condition of the registrant."84 The Commission reasoned that the
then-existing environmental provisions resulted in "less readable disclosure doc-
uments and [made] it more difficult to identify significant environmental pro-
ceedings."85 Such a change was made in the SEC's adoption of its integrated dis-
closure regulations regarding administrative or judicial proceedings "arising
under any federal, state or local provision which has been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or otherwise relating
to the purpose of protecting the environment. "' Such a proceeding must be de-
scribed only if it "is material to the business or financial condition of the
registrant."87
The controversy over environmental disclosures of the 1970s is now being re-
prised regarding climate change and its effects on public companies. In 2010,
the SEC offered guidance on this issue-an echo of its first release on environ-
mental disclosures in 1971-reminding issuers of the various provisions of Reg-
80. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
81. In re U.S. Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16223, 1979 SEC LEXIS 625, at *32
(Sept. 27, 1979).
82. Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6130, 44 Fed. Reg. 56924 (Oct. 3, 1979)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231 & 241).
83. Id. at 56924.
84. Proposed Amendments to Item 5 of Regulation S-K Regarding Disclosure of Certain Environ-
mental Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 6315, 46 Fed. Reg. 25638, 25640 (proposed May 8,
1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 25642.
87. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg.
11380, 11407 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 229, 230, 239, 240,
249, 250, 260 & 274). Disclosure is also required if the amount of the claim or potential monetary
sanctions exceeds 10 percent of the assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated
basis, and if a governmental authority is a party to such proceeding, it need not be disclosed if sanc-
tions are less than $100,000. Id.
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ulation S-K that might be triggered if the costs or consequences of climate change
are material88 Four topics that companies should consider in this regard include
the impact of legislations and regulation regarding climate change... [w]hen mate-
rial, the impact on their business of treaties or international accords ... [wihether
developments regarding climate change will create new opportunities or risks....
[andi [tihe actual and potential material impacts of the physical effects of climate
change on their business."89
Some investors and nonprofit groups, including the SASB, are pressuring the
SEC for further disclosure requirements." Whether the SEC will once again sub-
mit to a politically motivated agenda for more extensive disclosures seems un-
likely after the Commission's experiences with Dodd-Frank-mandated rulemaking
concerning conflict minerals and resource extraction.
B. CONFLICT MINERALS
In Dodd-Frank, Congress decided to achieve a humanitarian goal: ending a
violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"), where mil-
lions of civilians have perished from starvation and disease, and where rape
and other human rights violations have been rampant.91 Section 1502 of
Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC require registered and reporting companies
under the Exchange Act to disclose whether conflict minerals from the DRC or
adjoining countries are necessary to the functionality or production of any man-
ufactured products.92 The rationale for this provision was that armed groups
were financing the DRC's civil war by exploiting and trading conflict minerals.
9 3
Through public disclosure, Congress sought to make the public aware of the
source of an issuer's conflict minerals while promoting due diligence among is-
suers with respect to their supply chains.
Conflict minerals include tantalum, tin, gold, tungsten, or any other mineral
that the Secretary of State has found to be financing the conflict in the DRC
or an adjoining country.94 Thousands of companies manufacture and sell products
88. Commission Guidance Regarding the Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 9106, 97 S.E.C. Docket 2144 (Feb. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231 &
241), 2010 WL 2199526.
89. Nancy S. Cleveland et al., Sustainability Reporting: The Lawyer's Response, Bus. L. TODAY (Jan.
2015), http:lwww.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/01/04_pike.html (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., Jim Coburn & Jackie Cook, Cool Response: The SEC & Corporate Climate Change Re-
porting, CERES (Feb. 2014), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/cool-response-the-sec-corporate-
climate-change-reporting. The New York Attorney General has opened an investigation into whether
Exxon Mobil lied to the public and investors about the effect of climate change on the company. See
John Schwartz, Exxon Inquiry Both Mirrors and Contrasts with Tobacco Industry Case, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 7,
2015, at B3; see also Congressmen Join Call jor Federal Probe oj Exxon Mobil Disclosures on Climate, 47 SEc.
REc. & L. PEP. (BNA) 2125 (Nov. 9, 2015).
91. See GAO PEoRr, infra note 115, at 1.
92. Dodd-Frank § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
93. Id. § 1502(a).
94. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56275 n.6 (Sept. 12,
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b) thereinafter Conflict Minerals Final Rule].
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containing at least one conflict mineral. Conflict minerals are found in mainstream
electronic products, phones, computers, automobile parts, hearing aids, pacemak-
ers, jet engines, metal wires, and many other consumer products.
The SEC carried out its conflict minerals mandate by adopting Rule 13p-1 and
Form SD. The rule applies to any issuer that files reports with the SEC under
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, including domestic companies, for-
eign private issuers, and smaller reporting companies, 95 if conflict minerals are
necessary to the functionality or production of a product that the company man-
ufactures.96 The rule applies to companies that contract for the manufacture of
products with conflict minerals. 9 ' In the face of many conflicting comments, the
SEC determined not to include a de minimis exception for companies that use
only a tiny amount of conflict minerals. 98
The SEC proposed requiring disclosure about conflict minerals in an issuer's
annual report on Form 10-K, 20-F, or 40-F. The final rule, however, requires
disclosure on a special Form SD to be filed several months after the annual re-
port.99 Although the SEC initially proposed that information about conflict min-
erals be "furnished" to rather than "filed" with the SEC, the final rule requires
that the information be filed.l°° This distinction makes a difference with respect
to the potential liability of an issuer for faulty disclosure.101
Once an issuer determines it is covered by the conflict minerals rule, it must
conduct a reasonable country- of- origin inquiry to determine whether its conflict
minerals originated in the DRC or other covered countries. 102 The rule does not
provide detailed guidance or a definition of what is "reasonable" with respect to
its required conflict minerals diligence. If the issuer ascertains that its conflict
minerals originated in the DRC or other covered countries-or has reason to be-
lieve the minerals may have originated there-the issuer must exercise "reason-
able" due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals. 103
An issuer must also certify a third-party audit of those products that have not
been found to be DRC conflict-free. 104
According to the SEC's final rule, if the issuer determines that the conflict min-
erals it uses originated in the DRC or other covered countries, it must report on
Form SD that its products are not "DRC conflict-free" and make that report avail-
able on its website.1 ° 5 Alternatively, an issuer may report that its products are
95. Id. at 56287.
96. Id. at 56288.
97. Id. at 56279.
98. Id. at 56295.
99. Id. at 56298-304. By requiring that this report be "filed" and not simply "furnished," issuers
are subject to greater potential liability.
100. See id. at 56303-04; see also Conflict Minerals Update, supra note 12.
101. See Conflict Minerals Update, supra note 12.
102. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, supra note 94, at 56312.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 56320.
105. Id. at 56310.
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"DRC conflict-free" or temporarily report that its products are "DRC conflict-
undeterminable. 106 Large issuers may so report for two years- smaller issuers
may do so for four years. 107
The estimated costs of the conflict minerals rule are huge but contested. The
SEC estimated that it would cost companies approximately $3-4 billion to de-
velop compliance programs and $207-609 million to maintain compliance. 108
The National Association of Manufacturers estimated that the conflict minerals
compliance costs would range between $8-16 billion.109 A Tulane Law School
study estimated compliance costs at $7.93 billion. 110
Section 1502 has little or nothing to do with the SEC's usual concerns of in-
vestor protection or securities market policing, as underlined by the provision in
Dodd-Frank that requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the U.S.
Agency for International Development, to submit to Congress a strategy to ad-
dress the illicit trade in conflict minerals."' While in theory this legislation
should lead to tangible results by exposing the sources of the materials used
to produce issuers' merchandise, regulation is problematic. Global Witness, an
NGO pushing for these disclosures, reported that a majority of filings were in-
adequate because companies had not taken the necessary steps to understand
the humanitarian consequences associated with their supply chains 112 Still, a
spokesperson for this organization claimed that the Dodd-Frank provisions
and the SEC rule were having a salutary impact on the war in the DRC. 113
What primarily hindered the SEC conflict minerals mandate's effectiveness
was the Department of Commerce's inability to "indicate whether a specific fa-
cility processes minerals that are used to finance conflict in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo or an adjoining country. "114 Essential to this rule's efficacy is
issuers' ability to identify the sources of their "conflict minerals" to determine
whether they originate in the DRC or adjoining countries. If the Department
of Commerce cannot identify the origins of conflict minerals that fund violence,
how can the SEC reasonably expect issuers to do so? Not only does the Depart-
ment of Commerce have additional resources to investigate refineries and smelt-
ers across the world, but its own incomplete report released in September 2014
was overdue by over a year, giving the Department more time to investigate than
106. Id. at 56309.
107. Id.
108. See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomatic and Hu-
manitarian Watchdog, 81 FoRHAM L. RV. 1315, 1333 (2012).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1334.
111. Dodd-Frank § 1502(c)(1)(A).
112. See Yin Wilczek, NGOs Issue Mixed Verdict on First-Ever Conflict Minerals Reports, 46 SEc. REc.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1116 (June 9, 2014).
113. See id.
114. Emily Chasan, "Conflict Minerals" Too Hard to Track, Commerce Department Says, WALL Si. J.
(Sept. 5, 2014, 5:57 PM EST), http://blogs.wsj.con/cfo/2014/09/05/conflict-minerals-too-hard-to-
track-commerce-department-says/.
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issuers were given under the statute. 115 The SEC should not have expected issu-
ers to file operational due diligence reports of their supply chain conflict miner-
als in June 2014 when no list of smelters/refiners sourced by the DRC or adjoin-
ing countries was publicly available.
The business community has enjoyed some recent success in invalidating SEC
rules because the agency did not conduct a satisfactory cost-benefit analysis or
for other reasons.116 The National Association of Manufacturers sued the SEC
to invalidate the conflict minerals rule and was partially successful in National
Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC.117 Although the SEC was unable to quantify the
rule's benefits, the D.C. Circuit Court declined to strike down the rule pursuant
to a policy-based cost-benefit analysis- however, the court did hold that a part of
the rule was a "name and shame" disclosure obligation that violated the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it required companies to tell con-
sumers that their products were ethically tainted.118 The plaintiffs made a num-
ber of arguments charging the SEC's rulemaking as "arbitrary and capricious"
under the Administrative Procedure Act; however, all of those arguments were
rejected judicially. 119
A more serious challenge addressed the SEC's cost-benefit analysis. The secu-
rities laws do not contain a specific requirement for a cost-benefit analysis. How-
ever, the Exchange Act does prohibit the SEC from adopting any rule "'which
would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate' to advance
the purposes of securities laws."120 Further, the SEC is required to "consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation."1 21 The plaintiff claimed that the
SEC violated these provisions because it did not adequately analyze the costs
and benefits of the final rule.122
115. See id. A report by the Government Accountability Office found that most companies were
unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals in their 2014 filings with the SEC. See
U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABITY OFFICE, SEC CONFICT MINERLs RtLE (Aug. 2015) (GAO-15-561).
116. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir.
2005), amended by 443 F.3d 890, 896 (2006); see also Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, C.A. No.
12-1668, 2013 WL 3307114 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013).
117. 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2014).
118. See id. at 373.
119. The first charge was that the SEC did not include a de mrinimis exception. The SEC reasoned
that a de mrinimis exception would be contrary to the statute and its purposes because Congress knew
that conflict minerals are often used in very small quantities. The court decided that this determina-
tion had a rational connection to the facts and therefore was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 365-66.
The next charge was that the SEC's due diligence requirement contravened the statute. The court dis-
agreed, finding that the statute was "silent with respect to both a threshold for conducting due dili-
gence, and the obligations of uncertain issuers. The Commission used its delegated authority to fill
those gaps, and nothing in the statute foreclosed it from doing so." Id. at 366-67. Also rejected were
the plaintiffs claims that the SEC's due diligence threshold and the extension of the rule to contrac-
tors were arbitrary and capricious. Id.
120. Id. at 369 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2)).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012).
122. Nat'l Ass'n oj Mjrs., 748 F.3d at 369.
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In some prior decisions based on these provisions, the D.C. Circuit imposed a
so-called cost-benefit obligation on SEC rulemaking,123 and it has been unclear
how this analysis would play out when the SEC is following a congressional
mandate and Congress has not made a cost-benefit analysis. In the conflict min-
erals case, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC "exhaustively analyzed the final
rule's costs" and determined that the rule would "impose competitive costs,
but [has] relatively minor or offsetting effects on efficiency and capital forma-
tion. 124 The plaintiff did not dispute these findings but argued that the SEC
failed to determine whether the conflict minerals rule would achieve its intended
purpose. 125
The SEC determined that Congress intended section 1502 to achieve compel-
ling social benefits, but the agency lacked data that would have enabled it to
quantify those benefits. 126 The court held that this acceptance of legislative in-
tent was reasonable because the SEC had no choice under the statute but to pro-
mulgate a disclosure rule. 127 Further,
the rule's benefits would occur half a world away in the midst of an opaque conflict
about which little reliable information exists, and concern a subject about which the
Commission has no particular expertise. Even if one could estimate how many lives
are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so would
be pointless because the costs of the rule-measured in dollars-would create an
apples-to -bricks comparison. 28
The D.C. Circuit then held that a critical component of the conflict minerals
rule was contrary to the First Amendment. 129 Rule l3p-1 requires an issuer that
uses conflict minerals to describe its products as not "DRC conflict-free" in its
report to the SEC and on its website. 130 The court held that compulsion of con-
flict minerals disclosures is prohibited by the First Amendment. 131 Although it is
commercial speech, the court determined that compulsion cannot be upheld as a
requirement reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing fraud or
deception. 132 Further, the court stated that this disclosure is not clearly factual
and nonideological; therefore it is not entitled to "rational basis" review under
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 133 Rather, the conflict minerals disclo-
sure effectually compels an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically
tainted.
123. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005), amended by 443 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
124. Nat'l Ass'n oj Mjrs., 748 F.3d at 369.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 373.
130. Id. at 370.
131. Id. at 373.
132. Id. at 371 (citing RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
133. Id. at 370-71 (citing 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
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The court held that the compelled statement that an issuer's products are not
"DRC conflict-free" must be tested under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission. 134 This case requires the government to show that a
substantial government interest is directly and materially advanced by the re-
striction and that the restriction is narrowly tailored. 135 Because the SEC did
not provide any evidence that it chose the least restrictive means of achieving
its goals, the D.C. Circuit struck down this part of the rule and sent the case
back to the district court. 136
Although the SEC stayed the effective date of compliance with those parts of
the conflict minerals rule subject to the circuit court's First Amendment ruling,
issuers were nevertheless required to file their first Form SD disclosure state-
ments. 137 Yet, two SEC commissioners issued a statement in favor of staying
the entire rule on the grounds that the D.C. Circuit court opinion suggests
that the entire conflict minerals rule contravenes the First Amendment and,
therefore, that the district court should invalidate the rule as a whole. 138
The D.C. Circuit Court then decided American Meat Institute v. U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. 139 This case, concerning the labeling requirements of deli
meats, specifically overruled National Ass'n of Manufacturers' interpretation of
Zauderer, stating, [g]overnment interests in addition to correcting deception
can be invoked to sustain a disclosure mandate under Zauderer. 140 On rehear-
ing, the D.C. Circuit Court in National Ass'n of Manufacturers decided that Zau-
derer was inapplicable because the conflict minerals disclosures were not adver-
tising and the SEC's rule did not pass the Central Hudson intermediate
standard. 141 Moreover, even if the compelled disclosures were commercial
speech, the statute and regulations violated the First Amendment. 142 Therefore,
the court adhered to its original ruling that to the extent that the statute and rule
require corporations to state in an SEC filing and on their websites that any of
their products have not been found to be conflict-free, the SEC's final rule vio-
lates the First Amendment. 143 A strong dissent argued that the conflict minerals
disclosures were "purely factual and uncontroversial information. 144
134. Id. at 372-73 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564-66 (1980)).
135. Id. at 372 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66).
136. Id. at 372-73.
137. In re Exchange Act Rule 13p-1 and Form SD, Exchange Act Release No. 72049, 79 Fed. Reg.
26297 (May 2, 2014).
138. Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S. Piower, Comm'rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Public State-
ment: Joint Statement on the Conflict Minerals Decision (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/
PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541665582#.Ul-6kbHD cs.
139. 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
140. Id. at 27.
141. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The SEC and Amnesty Interna-
tional have petitioned for an en banc rehearing of this decision.
142. Id. at 524.
143. Id. at 530.
144. Id. at 538-39 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
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Ultimately, the Department of Commerce's inability to trace DRC and adjoin-
ing countries' conflict minerals to refining and smelting plants around the world
inherently undermines this statutory scheme's effectiveness. If the government
cannot figure out the source of the conflict minerals that it is trying to eliminate
from production, issuers cannot realistically be expected to satisfy the high stan-
dard set out in the SEC's rule. Eligible issuers can be expected to continue to
spend millions of dollars on a disclosure requirement unrelated to investor pro-
tection. The D.C. Circuit Court's decision puts regulated issuers and the SEC in
an awkward situation because companies have already attempted to comply with
most of the conflict minerals rule for two years and yet do not have to analyze or
form an opinion as to whether their products are "conflict- free." Moreover, the
court's holding that a "name and shame" disclosure violated the First Amend-
ment could invalidate other SEC disclosure rules.
C. MINE SAFETY VIOLATIONS
Section 1503 of Dodd-Frank requires issuers that operate mines to include
mine safety information in their Exchange Act periodic reports. 14' This disclo-
sure requirement is modeled on the safety requirements already imposed on
mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Mine
Act").146 The operation of section 1503 includes no materiality criterion for
the disclosures. For each coal mine that the issuer or its subsidiary operates,
the issuer must report the total number of violations of mandatory health or
safety standards that could significantly or substantially affect mine safety or
human health under Mine Act section 104147 for which the operator received
a citation from the Mine Safety and Health Administration- violations, cita-
tions, and imminent danger orders from the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration' the total dollar value of proposed assessments- the total number of
mining fatalities in the company's mines- and other actions of the Mine Safety
and Health Administration. 148
These provisions, aimed at enforcing the Mine Act, are "name and shame" pro-
visions similar to the provisions the D.C. Circuit Court struck down in the con-
flict minerals case. The disclosure requirements adopted by the SEC apply only
to mines located in the United States but apply equally to all U.S. mines regard-
less of their size. 149 The Commission does not permit issuers to group mines
by project or geographic proximity for disclosure purposes. o Section 1503
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m-2 (2012).
146. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878, 901-964 (2012); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Mine Safety Disclosure Requirements (Dec. 21, 2011), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-273.htm.
147. See 30 U.S.C. § 814(b).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78m-2(a)(1).
149. Mine Safety Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-9286, at 7-8 (Jan. 27, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239 & 249), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final2011/33-9286.pdf.
150. Id. at 8.
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specifies no particular presentation requirements, although the Commission rec-
ommends "tabular" presentation of data where possible.151
The Commission received comments requesting that the disclosures required
under section 1503 be "furnished" to the Commission rather than "filed," argu-
ing that the disclosure requirements of section 1503 were not aimed at providing
investors with information material to investment decisions.152 Thus, commen-
tators argued, such Exchange Act filings should not be actionable pursuant to
section 18 of the Exchange Act 153 The commentators' views, however, were
contested by other commentators who argued that disclosures relating to the
health and safety risks of mines operated by registered issuers are indeed mate-
rial to investors.154 The Commission agreed with the latter group, noting that
disclosures filed as a part of a periodic report are routinely required to be
filed with the Commission under Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 and 15d-14 certi-
fications.155 As a result, section 1503 errors or omissions in disclosures will ex-
pose issuing mining companies to potential liability under section 18 of the Ex-
change Act, governing all periodic reports. 156
The same information that the SEC requires regarding mine safety was already
on the website of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, so the efficacy of the
SEC disclosures might be questioned. According to an empirical study by four
University of Chicago Booth School of Business professors, however, there has
been an approximately 11 percent decrease in mining-related citations and injuries
since the SEC rules went into effect.157 At the same time, there has also been a
decrease in the productivity or profitability of the mining companies subject to
the SEC regulations. 15 Whether the mining safety disclosures are material to in-
vestors is another question, but the authors suggest that investor pressure may be
responsible for the increased preoccupation with safety of mining companies.
D. RESOURCE EXTRACTION
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to issue rules requiring issuers
that extract oil, natural gas, or minerals to disclose payments made to the U.S. or
foreign governments for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, nat-
ural gas, or minerals.159 It is often referred to as the Publish What You Pay Sec-
tion. 160 This provision's goal was to empower citizens of resource-rich countries
151. See id. at 16.
152. See id. at 17.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 21.
156. See id.
157. Hans B. Christensen et al., The Real Effects oj Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosures in Financial
Statements 11 (Chi. Booth Working Paper No. 16-05, 2016), ssm.com/abstract 2680296.
158. Id. at 4.
159. 15 U.S.C. 78m (2012).
160. Keljack, Section 1504 oj the Dodd-Frank Act: Implementation and Pending Litigation, N.Y. Ciy B.
(Nov. 2012), http:/Iwww.nycbar org/african-affairs/business-in-africa-law-project/1635-section-
1504-of-the-dodd-frank-act-implementation-and-pending-litigation.
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to hold their governments accountable for the wealth these resources generate.
According to Senator Richard Lugar, the provision mandated transparency and
sought to fight corruption and authoritarianism in countries with abundant nat-
ural resources, to increase the reliability of commodity supplies, and to promote
greater energy security.161 A number of development, anti-corruption, and anti-
poverty organizations, as well as citizens of developing countries, supported this
requirement's passage. 162 The National Resource Governance Institute character-
ized section 1504 as a "powerful tool that allows investors to properly assess risk
and citizens to see the value placed on their natural resources. 163 Once again,
the SEC was put to work for a cause extending beyond the scope of investor pro-
tection, promulgating rules not necessarily tied to any concept of materiality.
Under SEC Rule 13q-1 and amendments to Form S-D implementing Dodd-
Frank section 1504, disclosure was required if resource extraction issuers
were required to file annual reports with the SEC and if they engaged in the com-
mercial development of natural gas, oil, or minerals. 164 Firms indirectly involved
in the commercial development of these resources, such as pipe or drill manu-
facturers, were exempt from the disclosure requirements. 165 This rule applied to
both foreign and domestic issuers, affecting an estimated 1,100 issuers. 166 Pur-
suant to Dodd-Frank, issuers were previously required to comply with the new
rule for fiscal years after September 30, 2013. 167 However, American Petroleum
Institute v. SEC vacated this rule on July 2, 2013, mooting this deadline. 168
Under Rule 13q-1 issuers also had to disclose payments made to governments
by the issuers' subsidiaries or other controlled entities. 169 Section 1504 of Dodd-
Frank differed from the conflict minerals provisions and resulting rules because
these payments did have a de minimis exception. 170 Dc minimis payments were
single or multiple payments that equaled less than $100,000 during the most re-
cent fiscal year. 171
The types of payments Rule 13q-1 covered included taxes, fees, bonuses, div-
idends, royalties, production entitlements, and infrastructure improvements. 172
Issuers were to disclose the type and total amount of payments for each project
and to each government. 173 They were required to include the total amount of
161. 156 CONc. Rc. S3815-16 (daily ed. May 17, 2010).
162. See Jack, supra note 160.
163. Dodd Frank, NA RESOURCE GOVRNaNCE INST, http://archive.resourcegovemance.org/issues/
dodd-frank (last visited Apr. 1 2016).
164. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 67717
(Aug. 22, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249), 2012 WL 3611800 thereinafter Dis-
closure of Payments Final Rule].
165. Id. at "15.
166. Id. at *5.
167. Id. at *7.
168. 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 24 (D.D.C. 2013).
169. Disclosure of Payments Final Rule, supra note 164, at *2.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(i)(II) (2012).
171. Disclosure of Payments Final Rule, supra note 164, at *5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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payments by category, the currency used to make the payments, and the finan-
cial period in which the payments were made. 174 Issuers also were required to
disclose the business segment that made the payments, the government that
received the payments, and the project to which the payments related. 175
The rule included guidance on projects that must be disclosed, but the term
"project" was left undefined because, according to the SEC, that term is com-
monly understood by resource extractors. 176 The Commission required issuers
to present their information in an "interactive data format," which had to be
made available online to the public. 177
Commissioner Gallagher dissented from the SEC's adoption of Rule 13q-1 .178
He highlighted the fact that while the initiative has a desirable moral goal of in-
creasing government accountability, the SEC is not the appropriate agency by
which to achieve that goal. 179 Further, Gallagher was concerned over the de mi-
nimis exception, claiming that it was so low that it effectually excluded nothing,
and opined that countries with state-owned oil and gas companies such as
Russia, China, and Iran would reap competitive advantage because they do
not operate under such a costly disclosure regime.180 The American Petroleum
Institute ("API") opposed the SEC's rule for the same reasons, also arguing that
compliance with the disclosure requirements would impose significant costs on
affected issuers. The CEO of the API stated in 2012 that "the rule as written
would impose enormous costs on U.S. firms and put them at a competitive dis-
advantage against government- owned oil giants not subject to the rule."181 For
these reasons, the API, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Independent Petro-
leum Association of America, and the National Foreign Trade Council filed suit
against the SEC on October 10, 2012, to challenge the validity and appropriate-
ness of section 1504. 182
In American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated Rule
13q-1 .183 The court found that the SEC incorrectly interpreted section 13(q)
of the Exchange Act and, more specifically, that Congress did not require
174. Id. at "4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *43.
178. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting:
Proposed Rules to Implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.sec.
gov/News/PublicStmtIDetaillPublicStmt/1370542578412.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Sarah N. Lynch, Business Groups Sue SEC over Dodd-Frank Anti-Bribery Rule, REUTERS (Oct. 10,
2012, 8:18 PM EST), http://www.reuters.con/article/us-sec-lawsuit-idUSBRE8991NL20121011.
Note that in response to this statement, Senator Ben Cardin stated in favor of the rule: "[I]ncreased
transparency will not put companies that comply at a competitive disadvantage but will reduce the
risks for U.S. investors and it will allow citizens in resource-rich countries to hold their leaders ac-
countable. API wants to push us back to a time when the U.S. had few tools to add accountability and
stability to the inherently unstable energy sector." Jack, supra note 160.
182. See Jack, supra note 160.
183. 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 24 (D.D.C. 2013).
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reports filed under 13(q) to be publicly disclosed. The court reasoned that
"[s]ection 13(q) requires disclosure of annual reports in subsection (2)(A), but
says nothing about whether the disclosure must be public or may be made to
the Commission alone. Neither the dictionary definition nor the ordinary mean-
ing of 'report' contains a public disclosure requirement."184 Further,
section 13(q) expressly addresses public availability of information in the following
subsection, (3)(A), establishing a different and more limited requirement for what
must be publicly available than for what must be annually reported. Topping things
off, the Exchange Act as a whole uses the word "report" to refer to disclosures made
to the Commission alone.s
Finally, because the Commission believed that section 13(q) required complete
public disclosure, it did not consider the appropriateness of independently im-
posing such a rule pursuant to its discretionary rulemaking power. This lack of
consideration, Judge Bates concluded, rendered Rule l3q-1 procedurally
deficient. 186
The court also found that the SEC's denial of any exemption from disclosure for
issuers operating in countries that prohibit payment disclosure was arbitrary and
capricious. 17 The court noted that failure to accommodate this exemption "could
add billions of dollars of costs to affected issuers, and hence have a significant im-
pact of their profitability." 188 By extension, these consequences would also have
the effect of "drastically increas[ing] the Rule's burden on competition and cost
to investors."18' 9 By the Commission's own estimates, "billions of dollars are on
the line."190 The court also acknowledged that the lack of exemption would incen-
tivize other countries to adopt disclosure prohibitions similar to those in countries
like China, Qatar, Angola, and Cameroon.191 This result would not serve the con-
gressional goal of advancing international transparency efforts.
The district court did not consider the plaintiffs First Amendment claim re-
garding compelled speech,192 thus differing from the conflict minerals decision,
which spoke directly to the topic of compelled speech. The SEC did not appeal
this judgment and instead went to work on a new rule. 193 The district court's
decision spared issuers from the section's immediate reporting requirements,
but adoption of a new and improved SEC rule was probably inevitable. 194
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. at 20.
188. Id. at 22-23.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Id. at 23.
191. Id. at 21.
192. Id. at 11.
193. See Yin Wilczek, SEC Will Not Appeal Judgment Invalidating Resource Extraction Rule, 45 SEc.
REc. L. RP. (BNA) 1635 (Sept. 16, 2013).
194. See injra text at notes 195-97.
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After coming under fire from some Democrats in Congress 195 and from an order
from a U.S. district court in Massachusetts, 196 the SEC re-proposed resource ex-
traction rules on December 11, 2015. 197
The new proposal generally provides that both U.S. and foreign companies
that (1) file annual reports with the SEC and (2) engage in the commercial de-
velopment of oil, natural gas, or minerals are required to disclose the type and
total amount of payments made by such companies to a foreign government
or the U.S. government for each project.198 The revised rule is largely similar
to the original rule with only slight changes to reflect the district court's decision
to vacate. In particular, the re-proposed rule still requires public disclosure of
payments made to governments for resource extraction and does not exempt dis-
closures that foreign law would otherwise prohibit.199 Both provisions were
grounds on which the court invalidated the old rule. 200 Instead, issuers may
apply for, and the SEC may grant, exemptive relief on a case-by-case basis, draw-
ing upon Exchange Act precedent .201 The advantage of such an approach, as the
SEC espouses, is that "such an approach would permit [the SEC] to tailor the
exemptive relief to the particular facts and circumstances presented, such as
by permitting alternative disclosure or by phasing out the exemption over an ap-
propriate period of time."202
The newly proposed rule covers those entities that file annual reports with the
SEC pursuant to either section 13 or section 15(d) of the Exchange Act and en-
gage in the commercial development of oil, minerals, or natural gas. 203 Regis-
tered investment companies are exempt from the proposed rule, but it covers
EGCs, smaller reporting companies, and government-owned companies. 204
The activities the proposed rule covers include exploration, extraction, pro-
cessing, export, and acquisition of a license for such activity. 20 The proposal
seeks only to cover those activities directly connected to the commercial devel-
opment of oil, natural gas, or minerals- it does not cover ancillary activities.
Therefore, services such as marketing, investing in hardware, or preparatory ser-
vices would not be covered by the proposed rule. 206
195. See Rob Tricchinelli, House Dems Want SEC to Move Quickly on Resource Extraction Disclosure
Rule, 46 SEc. REc. & L REP. (BNA) 1164 (June 16, 2014).
196. See Notice of Proposed Expedited Rulemaking Schedule, Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC, Civ. A. No.
14-CV-13648 (Oct. 2, 2015).
197. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 76620, 80
Fed. Reg. 80058 (proposed Dec. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b) thereinafter
Resource Extraction Release].
198. Id. at 80078.
199. Id. at 80082.
200. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 24 (D.D.C. 2013).
201. Resource Extraction Release, supra note 197, at 80082.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 80059.
204. Id. at 80068.
205. Id. at 80069.
206. Id. at 80070.
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Companies engaged in covered activities must disclose the total amount of
each payment made to foreign governments or the U.S. government in further-
ance of their covered activities.2"7 The proposed rule carves out an exemption
for de minimis payments, which are payments for less than $100,000 (or the
equivalent if made in a foreign currency) .2 0 As proposed, disclosure is required
for payments in the form of taxes, royalties, fees, production entitlements, bo-
nuses, and dividends, as well as payments for infrastructure improvements. 209
Additionally, the proposed rule contains an anti-evasion provision that requires
disclosure of any activity or payment not included in one of the aforementioned
enumerated categories that is part of a scheme to avoid the statutory disclosure
requirements. 210
The trade groups that litigated against the SEC's rule in American Petroleum
Institute remain strongly opposed to the rule and claim that disclosures would
make them less competitive with foreign-government-owned oil and gas compa-
nies. 211 The European Commission adopted a rule similar to the SEC's resource
extraction rule for large undertakings and public interest entities as amendments
to the EU's Transparency and Accounting Directives for large undertakings and
member states are supposed to implement these provisions no later than July
2015 .212 Moreover, there is no indication that Europe intends to pull back on
this regulation because of the litigation and lobbying by oil and gas companies
in the United States, and therefore the same companies subject to the SEC
rule may soon be required to make similar disclosures in any event. 213 The Na-
tional Resource Governance Institute expects that foreign countries will continue
to endorse and build upon the reporting standard introduced by section
1504 .214 The newly proposed rule also allows for foreign companies to substi-
tute foreign-made disclosures for those required under section 1504, if the
SEC determines that the rules of the foreign jurisdiction where the disclosures
were first made are "substantially similar" to section 1504.215
As the foregoing indicates, the SEC is being buffeted by conflicting political
forces within the Commission, in Congress, and in the courts with regard to a
resource extraction rule. It therefore is not surprising that the SEC has had so
much difficulty drafting a rule likely to withstand negative scrutiny by the
D.C. Circuit.
207. Id. at 80059.
208. Id. at 80063.
209. Id. at 80059.
210. Id. at 80072.
211. See Tricchinelli, supra note 195.
212. EY, DISCLOSING OVERNMENT PAYMENTS IMPLCATIONS FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES 1 (2013). This
publication has a helpful table comparing SEC Regulation 13(q) and European Union requirements.
213. Id.
214. See Dodd Frank, NAT'L RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INST., http://archive.resourcegovernance.org/
issues/dodd-frank (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
215. Resource Extraction Release, supra note 197, at 80082.
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E. POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Citizens United 216 the Committee on
Disclosure of Political Spending, co-chaired by Professor Lucian Bebchuk of Har-
vard Law School and Robert J. Jackson of Columbia Law School, sent a petition
to the SEC to start a rulemaking proceeding to require disclosure of corporate
political contributions. 217 This petition has proven controversial. Two different
issues are involved concerning disclosure of political spending: campaign contri-
butions and lobbying activities. The SEC has received more than 1,200,000 com-
ments supporting the petition, which two former SEC chairs have endorsed .211
The petition's formal support is derived from a diverse array of constituents'
public interest groups, federal lawmakers, trade unions, and major investor
firms have all officially endorsed the petition .2 19 For the agency, this level of re-
sponse has been unprecedented, reflecting this issue's social and political signif-
icance. 220 Indeed, petitioners note that investor polls, shareholder proposals,
and policy statements of some large institutional investors demonstrate an in-
creasing desire to review companies' political expenditures. 221 The issue is po-
litical: bills have been introduced in Congress both to compel the SEC to man-
date such disclosures and to prevent the SEC from mandating such disclosures. 222
The Committee's petition asserts that investor interest in corporate spending
on politics is increasing. This interest did not spring up overnight- in 2006,
85 percent of polled shareholders perceived a lack of transparency surrounding
issuing companies' political contributions. 223 By the end of 2014, over one mil-
lion comments had been sent to the SEC urging the agency to move on this pe-
tition .224 Further, shareholder proposals on this subject have been increasing in
216. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also McCutcheon v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
217. See Petition for Rulemaking from the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spend-
ing to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf thereinafter Corporate Political Spending Petition]. In addition, the
co-chairs authored a law review article arguing in favor of SEC rulemaking. Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 Go. L.J. 923, 967 (2013).
218. See Dave Michaels SEC Should Require Political-Spending Reports, EX-Chairs Say, BLOOMBERG
Bus. (May 27, 2015, 3:30 PM CST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/sec-
should-require-political-spending-reporting-ex-chairmen-say-ia6reioe.
219. See Carey L. Biron, Record Response Urges the SEC to Require Disclosure oj Corporate Political
Spending, MINT PRESS NEWS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.mintpressnews.com/record-response-
urges-sec-require-disclosure-corporate-political-spending/196419/.
220. See Dina ElBoghdady, SEC Drops Disclosure oj Corporate Political Spending jrom Its Priority,
WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-drops-
disclosure-of-corporate-political-spending-from-its-priority-list/2013/11/30/f2e92166-5a07-1 e3-
8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html
221. Corporate Political Spending Petition, supra note 217, at 3.
222. See Rob Tricchinelli, House Committee Approves $1. 48B jor SEC, Teeing Up Conflict with Senate
on Funding, 46 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1258, 1259 (June 30, 2014); Democrats Unveil Legislation to
Require Shareholder Say on Political Spending, 46 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 775 (Apr. 29, 2013).
223. Corporate Political Spending Petition, supra note 217, at 6.
224. Press Release, Corp. Reform Coal., One Million Comments Urge the SEC to Stop Secret Cor-
porate Political Spending (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirct.cfm?
ID 4273.
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number. In 2013, seventy proponents filed fifty proposals on lobbying disclo-
sures- forty were put to a vote, averaging 26 percent investor support. 225 Insti-
tutional investors have also endorsed the proposed disclosure requirements-
TIAA-CREF and the Council of Institutional Investors are but two of many insti-
tutional entities that have released public statements in favor of the petition to
advance the "best interests of shareholders." 226
Even the U.S. Supreme Court is believed to have indirectly endorsed the pub-
lic disclosure of political expenditures. In a statement made in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, Justice Kennedy noted that "with the advent of the
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citi-
zens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials ac-
countable for their positions and supporters. "227 The operative word in that
statement is can- issuers are not currently required to make such disclosures of
expenditures, regardless of how accessible such statements may be through
the Internet.228 It appears that the "can" will remain the operative word in
this respect until the SEC decides otherwise.
However, strong opposition to these proposals and the rulemaking petition
remains. One argument against the petition is that such expenditures must be
reported to the Federal Election Commission, but such disclosure does not cap-
ture contributions to trade associations that engage in lobbying activity on behalf
of industry groups. 229 Some publicly traded corporations disclose political
spending voluntarily, but comparing these disclosures is difficult because each
company discloses different data. 230 Some opponents of the petition argue
that the petition has been advanced by those seeking "to pressure corporations
to stop funding political activities altogether."231 The fear remains that issuing
companies disclosing their political contributions will be subject to political re-
taliation by those whom the organization did not support. Others believe that the
SEC has no place regulating campaign finance in the first place. Blair Latoff
225. Investors File Resolutions, at 48 Companies Calling jor Disclosure oj Lobbying Activities, 46 SEc.
REG. & L REP. (BNA) 339 (Feb. 24, 2014).
226. See Corporate Political Spending Petition, supra note 217, at 16.
227. 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
228. See Adam Winkler, Political Corporate Contributions Won't Be Aired in Daylight, DAILY BEAST
(Dec. 5, 2013, 4:45 AM EST), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/05/political-
corporate-contributions-won-t-be-aired-in-daylight .html.
229. See CLARA TORRES-SPELLIScY, THE SEC AND DARK POLITICAL MONDAY- AN HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR
REQUIRING DISCLOSURE 18-20 (June 18, 2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/sec-dark-political-
money-history- report. pdf; see also Nicholas Confessore, S.E.C. Is Asked to Require Disclosure oj Dona-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.conV2013/04/24/us/politics/sec-is-asked-to-
make-companies-disclose-donations.html.
230. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 229, at 19-20.
231. Paul Blumenthal, SEC Chair Mary Jo White: "No One Is Working on Political Disclosure Rule,"
HUFFNGTON POST (May 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/16/mary-jo-white-
political-disclosure n_3287253.html (referring to a letter sent to executives of Fortune 200 compa-
nies encouraging them to oppose efforts to force publicly traded firms to disclose political donations,
written by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Busi-
ness Roundtable); see Opposition to SEC Disclosure Rule Joins Forces, UPI.coM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://
www.upi.com/Business-News/2013/04/24/Opposition-to-SEC-disclosure-rule-joins-forcesfUPI-
96681366830502/.
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Holmes, the executive director of media relations at the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, stated that "[c]ampaign finance reform is not, has never been, and should
never be a function of the SEC."232 Advocates for the SEC's involvement in cam-
paign finance remind opponents of the precedents for such involvement- in
1994, the SEC adopted rules to stop "pay to play" in the municipal bond mar-
ket 233 and in 2010 the SEC promulgated rules limiting the political fundraising
ability of pension fund advisers. 234
The Committee's rulemaking petition was taken off the SEC's agenda for 2014
without any formal explanation. To date, SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White has
not determined whether such rulemaking will be pursued in the future. 235 Rob-
ert J. Jackson, the associate professor at Columbia Law School who helped sub-
mit the original petition, is not surprised by the petition's removal from the SEC
agenda. He noted that the "[SEC's] new agenda is geared toward advancing pro-
posals that are mandated by Congress, so it is not surprising that a non-mandatory
initiative has dropped off the radar screen for now."236 However, he, like so many
others, remains confident that the SEC will eventually revisit and adopt the pro-
posed rule. 237 Lisa Gilbert, the director of Public Citizen's Congress Watch, stated
that while the SEC's dismissal of this issue is "disappointing, it's not the end of the
rule."238 This optimism appears well grounded in light of the petition's over-
whelming and unprecedented support. 239
Since SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White joined the agency, Republican law-
makers in the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as both SEC Republican
commissioners, have been pressuring her to drop the political spending
issue.240 Their reasoning is that the petition was highly partisan and politicized
and could "drag the agency into a political fray."241 Various business groups
share these concerns, arguing that such politicized disclosures are unlikely to
be of material significance to most shareholders and thus do not merit disclosure
under federal law. 242 Many of these arguments are fueled by partisan concerns
232. Winkler, supra note 228.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See Dave Michaels, SEC's Mary Jo White Defies Political Meddling in Year One, BLOOMBRG NEWS
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/ sec-s-mary-jo-white-defites-political-
meddling-in-year-one.html.
236. See ElBoghdady, supra note 220.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Carey L. Biron, Record Response Urges SEC to Require Disclosure oj Corporate Political Spend-
ing, MINT PR~s NEws (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.mintpressnews.com/record-response-urges-sec-
require-disclosure-corporate-political-spending/196419/ (Lucian Bebchuk, director of the Corporate
Governance Program at Harvard Law School and one of a group of academics who, in 2011, submitted
the original petition on the issue, said at a press conference: "T]he overwhelming support from public
comments the petition has attracted, and the strength of the arguments for transparency put forward in
the petition, provide a strong case for SEC initiation of the rulemaking process.").
240. Sarah N. Lynch, Activists Demand U.S. SEC Rule to Make Companies Reveal Political Spending,
REUTERS.COM (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-usa-election-sec-
politicalspending-idUSKBNOGZ2JM20140904.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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over the petition's possible consequences- the SEC's deferral of this issue has in-
vited accusations that the SEC has unduly succumbed to political pressures. 243
Professor Jackson has criticized the SEC for "turning its back on investors' inter-
ests because of Republican objections," pointing out that the SEC must retain its
status as a politically independent agency. 244 In response to these partisan pres-
sures and arguments, White assures legislators that she is "apolitical" and will
defer objective assessment of the petition for future review by her staff as a
part of the SEC's long-term agenda. 245
In any event, the SEC will not be adopting any rules regarding disclosure of
political contributions this year- a provision written into the policy riders of
the 2016 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, passed on December 18, 2015, explicitly
prohibits the SEC from doing so during fiscal year 2016 .246 A group of congres-
sional leaders led by New York Senator Charles Schumer was quick to inform the
SEC via an open letter that the language of the bill does not prohibit the Com-
mission from preparing, researching, or investigating potential rules, how-
ever. 247 In urging the SEC to remain committed to the issue, the letter stated,
"The ability of corporate executives to spend company resources for political
purposes .. raises significant investor protection and corporate governance con-
cerns .... Without transparency or disclosure, executives are free to spend funds
invested by shareholders without accountability or monitoring. "248 So far, the
SEC has not indicated that it has taken any measures to develop rules for the
future.
At least one NGO has sought to force the SEC to enact a political contribution
disclosure rule. In May 2014, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washing-
ton ("CREW"), led by named plaintiff Stephen Silberstein, submitted a petition
for rulemaking to the SEC .249 The SEC subsequently did not act on the petition.
Silberstein then brought suit against the SEC in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia seeking to compel the Commission to act on
CREW's petition under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") .250 On Janu-
ary 4, 2016, Judge Rosemary Collyer dismissed the suit, writing that: "Since the
SEC has not denied the petition and Mr. Silberstein has not asserted that the SEC
failed to act in response to a clear legal duty, it follows that he failed to state a
243. See Iris Dorbian, Activists Urge SEC to Require Disclosure oj Political Spending, CFO.coM (Sept. 5,
2014), http :/www.cfo.com/regulation/2014/09/activists-urge-sec-require-disclosure-political-
spending/.
244. See Lynch, supra note 181.
245. See ElBoghdady, supra note 220; see also Paul Blumenthal, supra note 231.
246. See Press Release, H. Comm. on Appropriations, House Approves Fiscal Year 2016 Consol-
idated Appropriations Package (Dec. 18, 2015), http://appropriations.house.gov/news/document
single. aspx?DocumentlD 394340.
247. Lisa Gilbert, SEC Can Still Work on a Corporate Political Disclosure Rule, THE HILL (Dec. 22,
2015, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/264036-sec-can-still-work-on-a-
corporate-political-disclosure-rule.
248. Id.
249. Petition for Rulemaking on Corporate Political Spending, No. 4-637 (Aug. 3, 2011).
250. Silberstein v. SEC., No. CV 15-722 (RMC), 2016 WL 29253 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2016).
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valid APA claim upon which relief can be granted ."251 The decision effectively
holds that the SEC is not obligated to respond to petitions by NGOs and private
citizens seeking to set the SEC's rulemaking agenda.
F. CYBERSECURITY
The seriousness of cybersecurity breaches and the resulting financial risks be-
came publicly apparent after 2010; therefore, Dodd-Frank did not mandate
cybersecurity disclosures by public companies. Discussions about how and
when registrants should make cybersecurity disclosures is more squarely within
traditional investor protection concerns than, for example, conflict minerals dis-
closures. Yet, disclosures about such breaches are at least as important to cus-
tomers of firms as to their investors, so there is still a question of the SEC's ap-
propriate role in monitoring cybersecurity and cybersecurity disclosures for
public companies not involved in the securities industry. The SEC's oversight
of cybersecurity by securities firms and the infrastructure of the financial markets
go considerably beyond disclosure matters and will not be discussed here.
On December 19, 2013, Target Corporation disclosed that approximately
forty million credit and debit card account numbers had been hacked from its
system between November 27, 2015, and December 15, 2013.252 Target later
announced on January 10, 2014, that the breach also involved a second
group of up to seventy million people.253 According to Target's 10-K filed on
March 14, 2014, more than eighty legal actions were filed against the company
as a result of this breach, and $61 million in pretax data breach-related expenses
were recorded in the fourth quarter of 2013.254 The company anticipated insur-
ance proceeds of $44 million to reduce its financial exposure.255 In addition to
the costs of remediation, the potential problems and interruptions from this
breach disrupted or reduced operational efficiency and adversely affected cus-
tomer confidence. SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar noted that this incident
serves as "one of the most prominent examples of the wide-ranging and poten-
tially devastating [consequences]" of cyber-attacks.256 This incident, unfortu-
nately, reflects a growing threat to registrants- the SEC reports that issuers' grow-
ing dependence on digital technology has resulted in more frequent and severe
cybersecurity incidents.257 The seriousness of this threat cannot be understated-
251. Id. at *5.
252. Maggie McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info on As Many as 70 Million Customers, FORB
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.forbes.comsites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/#7ec2elcO6bdl.
253. Id.
254. Target Corp., Form 10-K (Mar. 14, 2014), at 17.
255. Id.
256. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Public Statement: The Commission's
Role in Addressing the Growing Cyber-Threat (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541287184#.VNEzOC50ecE.
257. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, Cybersecurity, U.S. SEc. & Exr. CovM'N (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm thereinafter Cybersecurity Dis-
closure Guidance]; see also Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement at
SEC Roundtable on Cybersecurity (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/
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Jim Comey, director of the FBI, expects that the cybersecurity threat will soon
"eclipse" that posed by terrorism. 258
In response to this trend, the Division of Corporation Finance issued disclo-
sure guidance in October 2011 on cybersecurity for public companies, with an
emphasis on risk factor disclosures consistent with Item 503(c) of Regulation
S-K. This guidance instructed companies, to the extent material to a reasonable in-
vestor, to make appropriate disclosures of: (1) "aspects of the registrant's business
or operations that give rise to material cybersecurity risks and the potential costs
and consequences", (2) outsourced functions with material cybersecurity risks-
(3) '[d]escription of cyber incidents .. that are individually, or in the aggregate,
material"; (4) 'risks related to cyber incidents that may remain undetected for an
extended period"- and (5) "[d]escription of relevant insurance coverage. "259
There are various places in the Form 10-K annual report where reporting com-
panies could place cybersecurity disclosures. Though there is no explicit disclo-
sure requirement specifically referring to cybersecurity risks and incidents, the
Division of Corporation Finance has declared that material cybersecurity risks
must be disclosed and described as risk factors provided they are material
under Regulation S-K .260 In fact, the Division of Corporation Finance noted
that the omission of such risks may effectually render other required disclosures
misleading. 261 Cybersecurity risks should thus be described in some or all of the
following areas pursuant to Regulation S-K: risk factors, MD&A, description of
business, legal proceedings, and financial disclosures. 262 To omit cybersecurity
risks in these sections would be to ignore the reality that in today's technologi-
cally integrated world, there exists "a substantial risk that a cyber-attack [on an
issuer] could cause significant and wide-ranging market disruptions and investor
harm."2 6
3
Any cybersecurity risk materially affecting an issuer's operations, products,
professional relationships, or competitive standing merits inclusion in an issuer's
description of business. Any data breach that may result in a material threatened
claim, lawsuit, or regulatory investigation should be disclosed in an issuer's legal
proceedings section pursuant to Regulation S-K. Cybersecurity risks that impose
substantial costs on an issuer, either through remediation or prevention, must
similarly be included in financial statement disclosures. 264 Any anticipated
PublicStmt/1370541286468#.VNEyHy50ecE thereinafter White, Opening Statement] (noting that
cyber threats are a "global threat. Cyber threats are of extraordinary and long-term seriousness.
They are on the Division of Intelligence's list of global threats, even surpassing terrorism.").
258. Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Bejore the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov't Ajjairs,
113th Cong. 59 (2013) (statement of Hon. James B. Comey, Jr., Director, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation); see also supra note 257.
259. Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, supra note 257.
260. See Andy Roth, Javier Ortiz & Andy Blair, United States: Navigating the SEC's Cybersecurity
Guidance, MONDAQ (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.mondaq.con/unitedstates/x/302454/Securities/
Navigating+The+SECs+ Cybersecurity+Guidance.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. Aguilar, supra note 256.
264. Roth, Ortiz & Blair, supra note 260.
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impairment of an issuer's ability to report information accurately because of a
cybersecurity risk or event should also compel an issuer to discuss that risk in
the disclosure control and procedures section.265 Ultimately, the guidance pro-
mulgated by the Division of Corporation Finance should compel registered issu-
ers to "identify their critical digital assets and the risks that impact them" so that
these risks may be appropriately addressed and disclosed to investors. 266 After
all, such risks endanger not only the issuer but also investors and the market
as a whole. Commissioner Aguilar reminded the public during a speech at the
New York Stock Exchange that the consequences of cybersecurity extend "be-
yond the impact on the [issuing company] ," and that, as a result, issuing com-
panies should "consider [the threat's] impact on others."267 The consequences of
a cybersecurity attack may adversely affect an issuer, but, by extension, may de-
vastate the lives of a company's customers and investors. 268
Issuers must employ different regulatory lenses before and after a cyber-
security incident. Although the guidance cautions against boilerplate disclosure,
it indicates that "the federal securities laws do not require disclosure that itself
would compromise a registrant's cybersecurity."269 The Division has issued
over fifty comments to companies regarding their cybersecurity disclosures. 270
In addition, the SEC has begun enforcement investigations where disclosures
have been inadequate. 271 The SEC's focus is on both disclosure and controls .272
Both disclosures about past incidents and disclosures about ongoing risks are
required .273
Despite the guidance comment letters offer, pressure has been applied to the
SEC to do more about cybersecurity disclosures. In April 2013, Senator Jay Rocke-
feller requested that the SEC elevate its guidance on cybersecurity disclosures. 274
In the aftermath of the Target debacle and other high-profile cybersecurity
breaches, the SEC held a Cybersecurity Roundtable ("the Roundtable") on
March 26, 2014. In response to calls for action, Chairwoman Mary Jo White
began the Roundtable discussion by emphasizing the importance of cybersecu-
rity to the "integrity of our market system and consumer data protection."
2 75
One question discussed at the Roundtable was whether the 2011 Division of
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC Official Urges Broader Cyber-Attack Disclosure, RUTEs (Jun. 10,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/O6/1U/sec-cybersecurity-aguilar-idUSL2NOOR
13U20140610 (quoting remarks made by Commissioner Aguilar).
268. Id.
269. Id. (quoting remarks made by Commissioner Aguilar).
270. Daniel F. Schubert, Jonathan G. Cederbaum & Leah Schloss, The SEC's Two Primary Theories
in Cybersecurity Enjorcement Actions, CYBERsECURiTY, Apr. 8, 2015, at 11 thereinafter Two Primary
Theories].
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Eric Chabrow, Rockejeller to SEC: Elevate Cybersecurity Guidance, BANK INFO SECURITY (Apr. 11,
2013), http:lwww.bankinfosecurity.conmrockefellwer-to-sec-elevate-cybersecurity-guidance-a-5679.
275. See White, Opening Statement, supra note 257.
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Corporation Finance guidance was sufficient or whether more disclosure about
cyber risks and breaches should be required, even if not material, and if so,
whether such disclosure should be a line-item disclosure or otherwise be better
highlighted by the SEC .276 The SEC also has opened investigations into whether
a number of companies have properly handled and disclosed cyberattacks .277
Commissioner Aguilar has expressed the view that reporting such attacks should
go beyond the impact on the company to disclose the attack's effect on custom-
ers and others. 278 While cybersecurity breaches remain unaddressed by federal
securities laws, falling instead within the umbrella of materiality, Commissioner
Aguilar urges company boards to invest more time and resources in identifying
and addressing cybersecurity risks .279 Such efforts should produce outlines de-
lineating how companies should disclose cyberattacks to investors. 20 In the
wake of several high-profile cyberattacks and the SEC roundtable discussion,
cybersecurity has arrived safely within "the domain of investor protection and
corporate boards," catalyzing efforts toward the modernization of information
security. 281
Most recently, Congress has entered the conversation regarding cybersecurity
disclosure. On December 17, 2015, Republican Senator Susan Collins of Maine
and Democratic Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island introduced the Cybersecurity
Disclosure Act of 2015 .282 If passed, the bill would require SEC reporting com-
panies to disclose the cybersecurity expertise or experience represented on their
boards of directors or to disclose what other steps such companies have taken to
identify or evaluate appropriate nominees for the board .283 The bill does not de-
fine "cybersecurity expertise" but instead commands the SEC to define what con-
stitutes "expertise and experience in cybersecurity, such as professional qualifi-
cations to administer information security program functions or experience
detecting, preventing, mitigating or addressing cybersecurity threats .284 The
proposal is currently before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs for further review and consideration. 285
276. See White, Path Forward, supra note 1.
277. Two Primary Theories, supra note 270.
278. See Dave Michaels, Hacked Companies Face SEC Scrutiny over Adequacy oj Risk Disclosure, Con-
trols, 46 SE c REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1307 July 7, 2014).
279. See id.
280. See Lynch, supra note 267.
281. How Companies Can Apply the SEC's Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, DELONIE RISK & COM-
PLANCE J. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://deloitte.wsj.con/riskandcompliance/2014/02/13/how-companies-
can-apply-the-secs-cybersecurity-disclosure-guidance/ (quoting Vikram Bhat, a Deloitte & Touche
principal).
282. See S. 2410, 114th Cong. (2015).
283. See id.
284. Id. § 2(c).
285. See Kevin M. Lacroix, Senate Bill Would Require Disclosure Concerning Corporate Boards' Cyber-
security Expertise, D&O DIAY (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.dandodiary.con2016/01/articles/cyber-
liability/senate-bill-would-require-disclsure-concerning-corporate-boards-cybersecurity-expertise/.
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G. SUSTAINABILITY
Many large public companies, including 95 percent of the Global Fortune
250, voluntarily report matters relating to sustainability.286 This practice is
also known as corporate responsibility ("CR") reporting, or corporate environ-
mental, societal, and governance ("ESG") reporting. 287 The dominant standard
for such reporting was initially developed in a report by the Global Reporting
Initiative ("GRI"), a joint venture of Ceres and Tellus, two U.S. nonprofit orga-
nizations. 288 According to the GRI, a company's sustainability reporting is
'about the economic, environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday
activities. '289 The reporting also 'presents [an] organization's values and gover-
nance model and demonstrates the link between the strategy and its commit-
ment to a sustainable global economy."290
In 2010, the International Integrated Reporting Council ("IIRC") was formed
as an international body to develop a framework for defining material informa-
tion about an organization's strategy, governance, performance, and prospects,
as well as the social, environmental, and economic context within which it op-
erates.291 The European Union has already embraced compulsory sustainability
reporting. In spring 2014, the European Parliament passed a law that will go into
effect in 2017, requiring publicly traded companies with more than 500 employ-
ees to report on nonfinancial sustainability factors.292
Partly in response to these developments, the SASB was organized to establish
sustainability accounting standards for ESG reporting. This is a fairly high-powered
organization, with former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg as chair,
and former SEC Chairwoman Mary Shapiro as vice-chair.293 The SASB's goal
is to establish accounting standards for use by publicly listed companies in dis-
closing material sustainability issues on Form 10-K and in other standard SEC
filings.294 The SASB views its role as "extending accounting infrastructure to
286. KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBIITY REPORTING 2011, at 21 (2011),
https://www.kpmg.com/PT/pt/IssuesAndlnsights/Documents/corporate-responsibility2O 11.pdf.
287. See Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: Integrated Reporting
Is Practiced, Required and More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. THIoCvs LJ. 1060 (2013).
288. Id. at 1064.
289. About Sustainability Reporting, GRI, https://www. globalreporting. org/information/
sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
290. Id.
291. See International Integrated Reporting Council, http://integratedreporting.org/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2016).
292. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Improving Corporate Governance: Europe's Largest Compa-
nies Will Have to Be More Transparent in How They Operate (Apr. 15, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseSTATEMENT-14-124_en.htm.
293. See Daniel Brooksbank, Schapiro and Bloomberg Take Helm at Sustainability Accounting Stan-
dards Board, BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-01/schapiro-
and-bloomberg-take-helm-at-sustainability-accounting-standards-board-.html. Also on the board are
Elisse Walter, former SEC chair, Aulana Peters, former SEC commissioner, Jack Ehnes, chief execu-
tive of California State Teachers' Retirement System, and Peter Knight, one of the founding partners of
the sustainable boutique Generation Investment Management.
294. See Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, http://www.sasb.org/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2015).
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material ... ESG factors. Sustainability accounting standards are intended as a
complement to financial accounting standards, such that financial fundamentals
and sustainability fundamentals can be evaluated side by side to provide a com-
plete view of a corporation's performance. "295 The SASB argues that investors
will therefore be able to compare peer performance with regard to sustainability,
direct capital to more sustainable enterprises, and understand sustainability risks
and opportunities. 296
The sustainability topics that the SASB will address include environment, so-
cial capital, human capital, business model, innovation, leadership, and gover-
nance. 297 The SASB will develop its sustainability accounting standards at indus-
try levels, looking at the characteristics of various industry groups according to
their extensive license to operate, use of common capitals, and high costs on so-
ciety and negative environmental externalities. 298
Although the SASB has articulated its mission and methodology in terms of the
materiality of ESG information, it will include the viewpoints of non-investors in
its development of regulatory standards. 299 Further, sustainability reporting is
necessarily nonfinancial to some extent."' It may be difficult for the SASB to
maintain traditional concepts of materiality because GRI and IIRC concepts of
materiality go beyond investor protection to embrace the needs of additional stake-
holders. The GRI defines materiality as information that "may reasonably be con-
sidered important for reflecting the organization's economic, environmental and
social impacts or influencing the decisions of stakeholders. "301 The IIRC defines
a matter as "material if it is of such relevance and importance that it could substan-
tively influence the assessments of providers of financial capital with regard to the
organization's ability to create value over the short, medium and long term."302
The SASB's work is controversial- SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher at-
tacked it, saying it usurps the role of the SEC in setting disclosure standards. 
3 3
The SASB also has been criticized for broadening and misinterpreting the mean-
ing of materiality. 304 These criticisms may be premature and unfair. The SASB
asserts that its materiality standards are in line with the U.S. Supreme Court's
definition of materiality in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.30 5 Thus, the
295. Vision and Mission, USTAiNABIITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org/sasb/vision-
mission/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
296. Id.
297. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 41, at 7.
298. Id. at 17-18.
299. Id. at 9-12.
300. See id. at 3.
301. GRI, G4 SUSTAiNAME R PORTING GUDELINES: REPORTING PRNCIPL AND STANDARD DISCLOSURS 17
(2013), https:flg4.globalreporting.org/how-you-should-report/reporting-principles/principles-for-
defining-report-content/materiality/Pages/default .aspx.
302. INT INTEGRATED REPORTNG COUNCIL, BACKGROUND PAPERS OR MATRIITY (Mar. 2013), http://
www.theiirc.og/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/IR-Background-Paper-Materiality.pdf.
303. See Gallagher, supra note 42; see also Gunther, Murray & Gunther, supra note 43.
304. See supra note 303.
305. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.5. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality as "a sub-
stantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available"); see Legal FAQs,
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SASB reasons that it has neither mandated new disclosure nor usurped the SEC's
power. 306 Instead, it contends that it has identified the sustainability topics likely
to constitute "material information" and that therefore should be disclosed in
SEC filings 307 In its reply to criticisms, the SASB has asserted that it is not an
activist organization and that its role is to assist companies that "are at risk for
not disclosing material sustainability information in the Form 10-K," or that dis-
close "material sustainability information in [inadequate] boilerplate language."308
The relationship between the SASB and other standard setters is fluid. Jean
Rogers, SASB's founder and executive director, notes that the Board has fre-
quently been asked whether it seeks to compete with GRI, the organization
that "pioneered a sustainability reporting framework used by companies and
other entities around the world. '309 Answering in the negative, Rogers explained
that "[the SASB is] designing for a very specific mechanism, which is the Form
10-K. [The SASB] consider[s] [itseltl the floor and GRI more of the ceiling. In
other words, [its framework defines] the minimum set of things that are highly
material and would be recognized as such by the SEC. "310
The SASB is patterned to some extent after the FASB, which began as a private
sector standard-setting body for financial accounting principles. Because the SEC
recognized the FASB's pronouncements as "authoritative," the FASB has func-
tioned as a body with great power in setting accounting standards. If the SEC
should similarly recognize the standards developed by the SASB, the SASB
would have similar stature, but even if the SEC does not do so, the standards
developed by the SASB will likely influence SEC disclosure policies and the dis-
closure practices of public companies. Many of the topics this subpart has dis-
cussed would seem to fall within the bailiwick of the SASB, but it remains to
be seen how the SASB will develop its standards, how these will interface
with the IIRC and other international standards, and to what extent any new
nonfinancial standards will gain acceptance as disclosure items with public com-
panies and the SEC.
IV. THE JOBS ACT'S PROVISIONS
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The JOBS Act was passed on April 5, 2012, to assist entrepreneurs wishing to
go public by reducing the regulatory burdens of the federal securities laws and
SUSTiNABIiTy ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org/approach/legal-faqs/ (last visited May 9,
2016) thereinafter Legal FAQs].
306. Legal FAQs, supra note 305.
307. Id.
308. Letter from Jean Rogers, CEO & Founder, Sustainability Accounting Standards Bd., to Ro-
berta Karmel (Dec. 1, 2014) (on file with author).
309. Joel Makower, Why SASB Is a Game Changer jor Sustainable Business, GRENBI.COM (Oct. 1,
2012), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/10/01/why-sasb-game-changer-sustainable-business?
page 0%2C1.
310. Id.
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simplifying the offering process.3 1 ' Of relevance to this article is the relief
granted to EGCs from normal disclosure requirements in IPOs. Of further rele-
vance is the fact that EGCs are not necessarily required to become registered and
reporting companies under the Exchange Act.
An EGC is defined as a domestic or foreign issuer that has annual gross reve-
nues of less than $1 billion. 312 A public issuer will remain an EGC until the ear-
liest of the following: the last day of a fiscal year during which it had gross reve-
nues of $1 billion or more, the last day of the fiscal year following the fifth
anniversary of its IPO, the date on which it has issued more than $1 billion in non-
convertible debt during the previous three-year period, or the date on which it be-
comes a "large accelerated filer" (has a public float greater than $700 million). 313
EGCs have the option to use exemptions provided to them or, alternatively, for-
going those exemptions and complying with requirements for all other issuers. 314
EGCs have reduced obligations under the JOBS Act with respect to financial re-
porting. The JOBS Act allows EGCs to present only two (rather than three) years of
audited financial statements in an IPO registration statement, and the EGC need
not present selected financial data for any period prior to the earliest audited period
in the IPO registration statement or in subsequent registration statements so long as
the company remains an EGC .3 15 EGCs will not be subject to new or revised finan-
cial accounting standards until such standards apply to companies that are not re-
porting companies under the Exchange Act. 316 Also, any rules of the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") requiring mandatory firm rotation or
supplementary information about an audit and an issuer's financial statements will
not apply to an audit of an EGC .3 17 Importantly, the JOBS Act grants an exemption
for an EGC from section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley, which requires an attestation
report on an issuer's internal financial reporting controls from its auditors. 3
1
This exemption lasts as long as the issuer remains an EGC .319
EGCs are also relieved of some of the more burdensome disclosure and other
requirements concerning executive compensation. EGCs can omit the compen-
sation discussion and analysis ("CD&A"), provide compensation disclosure for
the top three (instead of the top five) executive officers for two years (instead
of three years), and provide a summary compensation and outstanding equity
awards table (instead of including all six required tables).320 Importantly,
EGCs are also exempt from nonbinding executive compensation arrangement
votes ("say on pay") for up to three years after loss of EGC status. 321
311. See injra text at notes 315-23.
312. JOBS Act § 101(a), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012).
313. Id. § 101(a).
314. Id. § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012).
315. Id. § 102(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012).
316. Id.
317. Id. § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2012).
318. Id. § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
319. Id.
320. Id. § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012).
321. Id.
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At least as important as the relaxed disclosure provisions for EGCs is that com-
panies that have raised funds from shareholders without going through a regis-
tered public offering can avoid the annual and periodic reporting provisions of
the Exchange Act. 322 An issuer will no longer be required to register its securities
under Exchange Act section 12(g) until it has 2,000 shareholders or 500 share-
holders that are not accredited investors. 323
B. MARKET PRACTICES
The reduction of disclosure rules for EGCs was a response to SEC mandates
that many entrepreneurial companies had found either difficult or obnoxious.
Yet, not all EGCs have taken full advantage of these provisions. In particular,
the relaxed financial reporting requirements have been met with mixed accep-
tance. A majority of EGCs have provided three years of audited financial
statements-as required for all other issuers-despite their ability to provide
only two years. 324 Most likely, underwriters and investors have demanded
three years so they can compare EGCs' financial information to non-ESG IPO is-
suers. In 2012, approximately 75 percent of EGC IPOs included three years of
audited financial statements, with most EGCs including five years of selected fi-
nancial data. 325 In 2013, 56 percent included three years of audited financial
statements, and approximately half of those issuers included three years of se-
lected financial data .326 Issuers that elected to provide two years of audited fi-
nancial statements also tended to provide only two years of selected financial
data .327
An issuer's decision to provide two rather than three years of financial data
tends to be "company and transaction specific."328 Those companies that opt
for less disclosure believe more financial data would add little value to their
stories, particularly if they are developing companies with little history. 329 But
marketing considerations and pressure from underwriters have led most EGCs
to decline to take advantage of the two-year financial data allowance. 
33
Although EGCs are not immediately required to comply with new or revised
GAAP financial accounting standards, 80 percent of issuers in 2012 EGC IPOs
and 76 percent of issuers in 2013 EGC IPOs elected to opt out of the exemption
and comply with up-to-date GAAP for three reasons. 33 First, there is a fear that
322. Id. § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78(lg) (2012).
323. Id.
324. The JOBS Act: The Resurgent IPO Market and What We Learned in Year Two, SKDDEN, ARs,
SLAE, MEAGHR & FLOM LLP (2014), https://www.skadden.con/insights/jobs-act-resurgent-ipo-
market-and-what-we-learned-year-two thereinafter SADDEN ARs].
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id.
330. See Deanna Kirkpatrick, The JOBS Act and IPOs, REV. SEC & COMMODITIES REG., Mar. 19, 2014,
at 71.
331. SADDEN ARes, supra note 324.
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EGCs will be viewed unfavorably by the public in comparison with their fully
GAAP-compliant competitors .332 Second, EGC IPO registration statements
must still account for the "then-current accounting disclosures required by Reg-
ulation S-X."'333 Third, auditors are uncomfortable with an audit that is not fully
compliant with current GAAP standards. 334
On the other hand, EGCs have overwhelmingly accepted the exemption from
including in annual reports an auditor attestation report on the reliability of in-
ternal controls in financial reporting- virtually all EGCs assert that they intend to
take advantage of the exemption to save time and money. 33 A review of fifty-
seven second annual reports filed in March 2014 for EGCs that went public
in 2012 indicates that not one registrant voluntarily submitted to the internal
controls audit provision of section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley. 336
Limited executive compensation disclosure exemptions were largely em-
braced. Seventy-five percent of EGCs elected to take full advantage of the exemp-
tions in 2012 .337 In 2013, 80 percent of issuers in EGC IPOs took advantage of
reduced disclosure with the majority of issuers omitting the CD&A section, filing
only the two required tables, and limiting disclosure to the minimum three ex-
ecutives over the minimum two-year period .331
The JOBS Act disclosure provisions have provided an interesting experiment
for SEC disclosure policy. On the one hand, the relaxed disclosure requirements
resulted from the business community's pushback regarding Sarbanes-Oxley and
other provisions regarded as onerous. On the other hand, underwriters and the
securities markets demanded that EGCs provide accounting information that the
JOBS Act did not mandate. Perhaps as the SEC embarks on the reform of its dis-
closure provisions, it should provide similar opportunities for private ordering in
this area.
C. REGULATION A AND CROWDFUNDING DISCLOSURE
The SEC has created simplified disclosure templates for expanded Regulation
A and crowdfunding offerings, both mandated by the JOBS Act as limited public
offerings for small businesses. 33 In April, the SEC adopted amendments to Reg-
ulation A and other rules to implement section 401 of the JOBS Act and provide
an exemption from registration for offerings up to $50 million. 34 These rules
332. See id.
333. Id.
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, THE JOBS AcT, Two YEARS LATER: AN UPDATED LOOK AT THE IPO LAND-
scaPE 12 (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.1w.com/thoughtLeadershipAw-jobs-act-ipos-second-year. Issuers
that complied did so because they lost their EGC status. Id.
337. SKADDEN AREs, supra note 324.
338. Id.
339. See in]ra notes 340 & 342.
340. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemption Under the Securities Act (Regula-
tion A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21805, 21855 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249 & 260).
820 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 71, Summer 2016
created Tier 1 offerings of up to $20 million annually, including no more than
$6 million on behalf of selling securities holders, and Tier 2 offerings of up to
$50 million annually, including no more than $15 million on behalf of selling
shareholders. 341
In addition, after a lengthy rulemaking process, the SEC passed the crowd-
funding rules in November 2015 .342 Crowdfunding uses the Internet to raise
capital for a wide range of projects, typically seeking small contributions from
a large number of individuals.
The crowdfunding rules cover the issuers eligible to use crowdfunding, the
procedures they must follow, and the qualifications for selling intermediaries-
brokers or crowdfunding portals-through which the issuers must make crowd-
funding offerings. The rules permit a company to raise a maximum aggregate
amount of $1 million through crowdfunding offerings over a twelve-month
period .3 4 3 Because of the risky nature of these offerings and the concern that in-
vestors who participate in these offerings may be defrauded, the amount individ-
ual investors can invest in the aggregate for all crowdfunding offerings is limited.
If an investor's annual income or net worth is less than $100,000, the maximum
he or she can invest is the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the lesser of annual
income or net worth .34 4 If both annual income and net worth are equal to or
more than $100,000, the maximum allowed investment is 10 percent of the
lesser of annual income or net worth .3 4 Further, the aggregate amount of secu-
rities sold to any investor through all crowdfunding offerings may not exceed
$100,000.346
Disclosure requirements for Regulation A offerings were left to the SEC to pre-
scribe, both as to initial offerings and continuing disclosure. 3 4 With regard to
crowdfunding offerings, however, Congress prescribed necessary disclosures
for initial offerings and continuing disclosure, which the SEC implemented in
the crowdfunding rules. 341 Information about the issuer's business and business
plan is required, as well as the purpose of the offering and use of proceeds, but
the SEC took a flexible approach as to how these matters should be discussed .
34 9
Among other things, disclosure of related-party transactions and an equivalent of
a management discussion and analysis were relaxed .
3 5
Of particular interest in terms of simplified and less expensive disclosure are
the requirements for financial statements, which are based on the amounts of
341. Id. at 21807.
342. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71388 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274) thereinafter CrowdFunding
Release].
343. Id. at 71389.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 71390.
347. Securities Act § 3(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(4) (2012).
348. Id. § 4A(b)(1), (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-A(b)(1), (4) (2012).
349. Crowdfunding Release, supra note 342, at 71401.
350. Id. at 71406-07.
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securities offered and sold within the preceding twelve months. For issuers of-
fering $100,000 or less, the principal executive officer must certify the disclo-
sures of the amount of total income, taxable income, and total tax as reflected
in the issuer's federal income tax returns as true and complete.351 If financial
statements that a public accountant who is independent of the issuer has re-
viewed or audited are available, the issuer must provide those and need not pro-
vide the information on income tax returns. 352
If an issuer is offering more than $100,000 but not more than $500,000, or
the issuer is offering more than $500,000 but not more than $1 million and
is relying on the crowdfunding exemption for the first time, the issuer must pro-
vide financial statements reviewed by an independent public accountant. 3 5 3 If
audited financial statements are available, however, the issuer must provide
them . 3 54 Issuers that have previously sold securities in reliance on the crowd-
funding exemption must provide audited financial statements by an accountant
independent of the issuer. 3 5 5
All issuers relying on the crowdfunding exemption must file with the SEC and
provide to investors and their intermediaries a complete set of their financial
statements, including balance sheets, statements of comprehensive income,
statements of cash flows, statements of changes in stockholders' equity, and
notes to the financial statements 356 Statements that are not audited must be la-
belled as non-audited . 5 Further, all financial statements must be prepared in
accordance with U.S. GAAP358
The SEC's final crowdfunding rules also provide for ongoing reporting re-
quirements for issuers that take advantage of the exemption. An annual report
must be filed with the SEC and posted on the issuer's website no later than
120 days after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report 3 59 The financial
statements in the annual report need not be audited but can be certified by the
principal executive officer of the issuer to be true and complete in all material
respects.360 If audited reports are available, however, they must be provided
and the certification is not necessary. 36 The general content of the annual re-
port, in addition to the financial statements, should be the same as the informa-
tion required in an offering statement 362 Although the disclosure costs should
be less than the costs of preparing the initial offering statement, annual updates
351. Id. at 71390.
352. Id. at 71412.
353. Id. at 71408.
354. Id. at 71412.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 71408.
357. Id. at 71412.
358. Id. at 71414.
359. Id. at 71418.
360. Id. at 71420.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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are important because securities sold in a crowdfunding offering will be freely
tradeable after a year. 363
As Commissioner Kara Stein pointed out when the crowdfunding rules were
passed, the accounting provisions are a compromise between investor protec-
tion, where an accountant opines in an audit on the accuracy of financial state-
ments, and the cost of an audit to a start-up small business. 364 The JOBS Act
forced the SEC to create new disclosure templates for crowdfunding offerings.
How market practices will evolve and whether this experiment will influence
SEC efforts to simplify disclosure requirements generally remains to be seen.
V. THE SEC's REVIEW PROJECT
A. THE REVIEW OF REGULATION S-K REPORT
One of the studies required of the SEC under the JOBS Act was a review of the
disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K for the purposes of modernizing and
simplifying disclosure requirements and reducing compliance costs for EGCs 365
Although various disclosure reform efforts have transpired since the 1960s, SEC
Chair Mary Jo White welcomed this mandate as an opportunity to reform disclo-
sure requirements for all issuers and to encourage support and input from mar-
ket participants 366 The SEC staff published its review of Regulation S-K
in December 2013 .367 The S-K Report supported Chair White's call for holistic
review.
On October 15, 2013, Chair White addressed the National Association of Cor-
porate Directors ( "NACD") and emphasized two major themes in disclosure re-
form: (1) improving efficiency through modernization and (2) harmonizing
sources of disclosure requirements. 6 Intermittent disclosure reform since the
1960s has driven an "information overload" that challenges the effectiveness of
current disclosure requirements for purposes of protecting investors 369 First,
concerning efficiency, Chair White raised three key questions: (1) whether spe-
cific disclosure requirements are unnecessary, too industry-specific, outdated, or
simply not wanted by investors- (2) whether information is readily available else-
where- and (3) whether information repetition can be avoided and achieved
363. Id. at 71420.
364. Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on the Adoption of Regulation
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-adoption-of-
regulation-crowdfuding-stein.html.
365. JOBS Act § 108.
366. See MaryJo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The SEC in 2014: Address at the 41st
Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
Speech/1370540677500#.U46kxSdgjIy; White, Path Forward, supra note 1; Mary Jo White, Chair,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Importance of Independence- Address at Fordham Law School
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/DetailUSpeech/1370539864016.
367. U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMMN, REPORT ON REViEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS iN REGULATiON S-K
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf thereinafter
S-K REPORT].
368. See White, Path Forward, supra note 1.
369. See id.
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through principles-based disclosure 370 Second, Chair White acknowledges the
many sources contributing to lengthy and complex disclosure requirements-
3 7
the Commission itself is responsible for myriad Commission releases, staff inter-
pretations, and guidance. Complex disclosure stems from pressures beyond
those imposed by the Commission, such as congressional mandates, investor de-
mands, and dated industry guides .372
In December 2013, the Commission released the report on Regulation S-K dis-
closure requirements, which reiterated themes and goals articulated by Chair
White in her October 2013 NACD address-specifically, the need for compre-
hensive review beyond Regulation S-K. Although the S-K Report is predomi-
nantly a historical overview of the disclosure regime, it does articulate the SEC
staffs approach to disclosure reform.
The S-K Report begins by outlining the scope of review, which excludes re-
cently adopted regulations for specific transactions. 7 Part III of the S-K Report
considers requirements for reform in seven categories 74 Each section is divided
by disclosure items and is followed by (1) background information, (2) summary
of substantive changes to date, (3) description of scaled requirements or exemp-
tions provided, and (4) discussion of relevant comments submitted.
With respect to modernizing Regulation S-K, the staff recommends: (1) fur-
ther information gathering and review, based on staff research and input from
market participants-3 75 (2) conducting economic analysis for cost-effective im-
provements,3 76 and (3) devising a framework for such review and analysis 77
The staff believes that a comprehensive approach (wholesale review of substance
and procedure) is preferable to a targeted approach ("topic by topic" review of
substance and procedure).3 7 8 comprehensive review, although time consuming,
will allow the staff to harmonize sources of disclosure requirements and consol-
idate rules . 7 According to the staff, the framework for disclosure reform should
(1) be principles-based, (2) scale according to issuer size, (3) include an evalu-
ation of systematic methods of delivery and presentation of information, and (4)
improve readability and accessibility 380
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. S-K RPoR, supra note 367, at 4 (discussing the exclusion of Regulation AB and Regulation
M-A from the review). The staff is considering review of Regulation M-A and seeks input from market
participants. Id. at 102.
374. Id. at 30-91.
375. Id. at 93-94, 97.
376. Id. at 94-95.
377. Id. at 95-97.
378. Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher argued for a targeted approach out of fear that compre-
hensive review would "risk spending years preparing an offensive so massive that it may never be
launched." Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 2nd Annual
Institute for Corporate Counsel (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370540462287#. The staff admits comprehensive review will be time consuming and did not re-
lease a timeline in the S-K Report. S-K REPORT, supra note 367, at 104.
379. S-K RPorT, supra note 367, at 95-96.
380. Id. at 97-99.
824 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 71, Summer 2016
Within Regulation S-K, the staff emphasizes specific areas for reform: (1) risk-
related requirements, (2) requirements relating to a registrant's business and op-
erations, (3) corporate disclosure requirements, (4) executive compensation
requirements, (5) offering-related requirements, (6) exhibit requirements, and
(7) general requirements under Item 10.381 The S-K Report also encourages
the review of issues that interplay with Regulation S-K, which include (1) criteria
for EGC status, (2) standards in industry guides (many of which are outdated),
(3) financial reporting requirements under Regulation S-X, and (4) disclosure
requirements in rules and forms.382 The staff has not articulated a timeframe
for the proposed plan of action. 383
B. IMPLEMENTATION-THE DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS INITIATIVE
In a speech before the American Bar Association, Keith Higgins, Director of
the Division of Corporation Finance, relayed the Division's plan of review. 384
The Division will first focus on business and financial disclosures generally
found in periodic or current reports. 385 The initial review will also analyze in-
dustry guides and form-specific disclosure requirements 386 The second phase
of the review will consider how to modernize disclosure requirements. 387
As of April 2014, the Division was in the process of forming teams to review
specific requirements in Regulation S-K and industry guides for determining
whether requirements are outdated or redundant .3 88 In the interim, Director
Higgins called on lawyers for support. Director Higgins stressed that diligent
lawyering can improve disclosure effectiveness by reducing repetition in disclo-
sure, focusing disclosure with more specific language, and eliminating outdated
information such as obsolete disclosures. 389
The Federal Regulation of Securities Committee and the Law and Accounting
Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association formed
a working group, chaired by former Division of Corporation Finance Chief
Counsel and Associate Director Thomas J. Kim, to respond to the Division's re-
quest for comments. This committee has submitted two extensive comment let-
ters to the SEC. One letter recommended changes to Regulation S-X intended to
(i) improve the quality and utility to investors of certain financial disclosures, (ii)
enhance consistency and reduce redundancy within financial disclosure require-
ments, (iii) facilitate registrant preparation of required disclosures and promote in-
vestor understanding of their significance, and (iv) replace unnecessarily detailed
381. Id. at 99-102.
382. Id. at 102-04.
383. The staff, however, recognizes that it will be a time consuming and costly endeavor. Id. at 96,
104.
384. Higgins, Disclosure Effectiveness, supra note 8.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
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and complex disclosures with more focused and concise disclosures that highlight
meaningful information regarding a registrant's business, key risks and financial
condition and results of operations.390
The second letter focused on recommended changes to Regulation S-K concern-
ing materiality, the elimination of duplicate disclosures, and the consolidation of
guidance and obsolescence.391 These letters contain many useful suggestions but
represent incremental, not radical, changes. Yet, such incremental changes are
both more feasible and more likely to be implemented than more sweeping
amendments to the SEC's disclosure rules would be.
As part of this initiative, the SEC released a request for comment on proposed
changes to Regulation S-X disclosures for certain entities other than the regis-
trant.392 These proposals relate to financial information about acquired businesses,
unconsolidated subsidiaries, guarantors and issuers of guaranteed securities, and
affiliates whose securities collateralize registered securities. Specifically, the release
proposes changes to Rules 3-05, 3-09, 3-10, and 3-16 of Regulation S-X. 3 9 3 Fur-
ther similar requests for streamlining disclosure can be anticipated as the Disclo-
sure Effectiveness Initiative moves forward.
As the SEC's Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative has progressed, the director of
the Division of Corporation Finance has suggested some possible reform ideas
beyond simply amending Regulations S-K and S-X. These are scaled disclosure
initiatives, which amount to a principles-based approach to disclosure and a
company file that would better suit today's technology and would be updated
as material events occur.
3 9 4
VI. BALANCING INVESTOR AND OTHER DEMANDS
The enormous growth of the private placement markets has blurred the dis-
tinction between public and private companies. The JOBS Act recognized this
problem but made matters worse. There are two lenses through which one
may view the different disclosure requirements placed on companies of different
sizes. Under the Exchange Act, companies become reporting companies because
their securities are registered pursuant to (i) section 15(d) because they have
made a registered public offering under the Securities Act, (ii) section 12(b) be-
cause they list on a national securities exchange, or (iii) section 1 2 (g) because
390. Comment on Disclosure Effectiveness, Letter from Catherine T. Dixon to U.S. Sec.& Exch.
Comm'n 2 (Nov. 14, 2014), http://sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosureeffectiveness-
23.pdf.
391. Comment on Disclosure Effectiveness, Letter from Catherine T. Dixon to U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Mar. 6, 2015), http://sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosure-effectiveness-
32.pdf.
392. See Request for Comment on the Effectiveness of Financial Disclosures About Entities Other
than the Registrant, Securities Act Release No. 9929 (Sept. 25, 2015), 2015 WL 5637567.
393. See id.
394. See Keith F. Higgins, Dir, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Shaping Company
Disclosure- Remarks Before the George A. Leet Business Law Conference (Oct. 3, 2014), http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705431-4412 thereinafter Higgins, Shaping Company
Disclosure].
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they have a sufficient number of shareholders and total assets. 9 5 Section 12 (g)
was added to the Exchange Act in 1964 and required any issuer with $1 million
in assets and 500 shareholders of record to register its securities and become a re-
porting company 396 The JOBS Act changed the number of shareholders necessary
to trigger section 12(g) registration to 2,000 shareholders of record, provided that
1,500 are accredited investors3 9 ' Further, employees who received shares in an
employee compensation plan that was exempt from Securities Act registration
are not counted as shareholders of record 398
The metric of shareholders of record in triggering Exchange Act registration is
obsolete. While the number of record shareholders and amount of assets were
convenient ways to distinguish publicly traded companies from other issuers
in 1964, that metric does not take into account developments in the clearance
and settlement of securities transactions. Public companies no longer have
their share ownership recorded in the names of beneficial shareholders. Rather,
shares are held in the nominee names of financial institutions and securities de-
positaries to facilitate clearance and settlement 9 9 Ascertaining the number of
beneficial owners of such issuers or the number of nonaccredited beneficial
owners would be a next-to-impossible task.
Under the Securities Act, there are four categories of issuers, all subject to dif-
ferent disclosure and other requirements when offering their securities: WKSIs,
seasoned issuers, unseasoned reporting issuers, and non-reporting issuers. If
non-reporting companies make a public offering, they must do so by filing a reg-
istration statement on Form S-1, a long-form full disclosure document that is
subject to the SEC staffs review and comment process. Thereafter, they generally
become a reporting company. After companies have been reporting companies
for twelve calendar months, they become seasoned issuers and may offer securities
on Form S-3, a shorter registration form than Form S-1. They are also allowed to
incorporate information in their filed Exchange Act documents by reference.
When Form S-3 was initially approved, eligibility was conditional upon a
common stock float of $75 million, but this requirement was eliminated in
2007. 4  In 2005, the SEC created a new category of filers, WKSIs, that became
entitled to make common stock and debt offerings pursuant to an automatic
shelf registration process that was not subject to any SEC staff review. 401 For
such offerings, WKSIs were any issuers with a common stock market capitaliza-
395. Exchange Act §§ 12(b), (g), 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (g), 78o(d) (2012)
396. At first, the SEC (by rule) raised this amount to $3 million in 1982, then to $5 million in
1986, then to $10 million in 1996. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 70, at 355 n.81.
397. JOBS Act § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2012).
398. Id. § 502.
399. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 70, at 355.
400. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms 5-3
and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 8878, 72 Fed. Reg. 73534 (Dec. 27, 2007) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
401. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722 (Aug. 3,
2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249, and 274).
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tion of $700 million.402 Another alternative to using record ownership to deter-
mine an issuer's status under the Exchange Act registration requirements was
utilized when the SEC passed rules making it easier for foreign issuers to de-reg-
ister. 4° 3 One metric that a foreign issuer can use other than number of record
shareholders is annual average daily trading volume. 404 If average daily trading
volume over a twelve-month period in the United States is no more than 5 per-
cent of worldwide trading volume, de-registration is permitted.405
The rule adopted under the JOBS Act that deregulates Exchange Act registra-
tion requirements was related to the growth of the private placement market and
the development of marketplaces for the resale of privately placed securities. 406
Further, companies with Internet-based business models and other new business
entities have exhibited a strong desire to avoid or substantially delay becoming
SEC registrants, even though their principals have wanted to tap outside capi-
tal.407 One reason behind this desire may be that Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank have created more onerous obligations with regard to governance and dis-
closure. 40 All of these developments have led to a reconsideration of which
companies should be considered "public" companies subject to the full force
of SEC disclosure requirements.
This reconsideration has taken a number of different forms. Kara Stein, a cur-
rent SEC commissioner, has suggested that perhaps disclosure obligations
should scale to the needs of different investor groups. 409 The procedure of scal-
ing disclosure requirements is complicated by the challenge of effectively differ-
entiating certain investor groups. For instance, the distinction between institu-
tional and retail investors is difficult. Still, such distinctions have been made
with regard to qualified institutional buyers, accredited investors, and other in-
vestors for purposes of unregistered private placements and, more recently, for
crowdfunding offerings by EGCs. 410 But even large institutional investors have
different views about, for example, sustainability disclosures. Activist hedge
402. Id. at 44727.
403. Id. at 44729.
404. Id.
405. See Rule 12h-6(a)(4)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6(a)(4)(i) (2015).
406. See Guttentag, supra note 10, at 174-76.
407. E.g., Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 70, at 338-39 (Facebook story).
408. See Karmel, Realizing the Dream, supra note 39; see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making ojQuack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE LJ. 1521 (2005). Another reason may be
a desire to maintain control by entrepreneurs against possible interference by activist investors. Yet,
because disparate voting stock is permitted in the United States, such control can be maintained even
in public companies with a large capitalization. See Out o] Control, ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2014), http://
www. economist. com/news/finance-and-economics/2 1618889 -more-worlds-big-stockmarkets-are-
allowing-firms-alibaba-sideline.
409. See Kara Stein, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to the Council of Institutional
Investors (May 8, 2014), http://www. sec. gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137054164008#.
VNruxDF92d thereinafter Stein Remarks].
410. See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition oj an Accredited Inves-
tor, 39 RUTGERs L J. 681 (2008); see also Changes to Exchange Act Registration Requirements to Im-
plement Title V and Title VI of the JOBS Act, Securities Act Release No. 9693, 79 Fed. Reg. 78343
(Dec. 30, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 240).
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fund investors may consider such matters irrelevant- government pension funds
may consider them important. What may be considered "disclosure overload" for
one investor group could simultaneously be regarded by another as insufficiently
informative.411 The director of the Division of Corporation Finance has ad-
vanced the theory that, given different informational needs, disclosure require-
ments could be tailored in accordance with the demands and interests of distinct
investor groups. 412
While various investor groups have diverging informational expectations,
what many groups can agree on is the fact that more disclosure is not necessarily
better disclosure. Commissioner Stein noted that the evolution of federal securi-
ties laws has given rise to an era "with hundreds of pages per filing for some large
issuers," prompting investors and issuers alike to petition the Commission for
reductions in disclosure requirements. 413 The sheer volume and complexity of
the disclosures mandated by the SEC can render them "very hard to evaluate"
by investors 4 14 and quite expensive to prepare for issuers. 415 While "removing
redundancies" and eliminating archaic disclosure requirements may begin to
streamline disclosures, Commissioner Stein has stated that such practices,
while helpful, should not be the Commission's "central focus."416 In 1967,
then-SEC Chairman Manny Cohen pointed out that "[b]etter disclosure is not
at all synonymous with less disclosure. "417 Commissioner Stein agrees with
that sentiment. Still, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance Keith
Higgins noted that many investors still demand more disclosure from issuers
rather than less. 41 The call for less disclosure is loud but short of uniform,
though the call for more streamlined disclosure appears uncontested .4 19 Never-
theless, there appears to be no direct correlation between the amount and the
quality of disclosure, at least in the eyes of the Commission. Therefore, Commis-
sioner Stein seeks to shift the Commission's attention away from the amount of
disclosure and toward the development of better disclosure. 420
A key to achieving better disclosure may lie in affording companies more flex-
ibility. Such flexibility may come in two forms. According to Director Higgins,
one may be a principles-based approach to disclosure that would allow issuers
"to provide disclosures that it believes are material to investors."421 The second
411. Higgins, Disclosure Effectiveness, supra note 8.
412. See id.
413. Stein Remarks, supra note 409.
414. Hu, Too Complex, supra note 14, at 1652 (quoting KPMG FINANCIAL INSTITTION RISK DISCLOSUR
BEST PRCTICE SURVEY 2008, at 5 (2008)).
415. See EY, SEC STAF RECOMMENDS A COMPiHENsiE RWEW O SEC DIScLOSUR REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 2,
2014), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/TothePointCC0386-RegulationSKStudy-
2January2014/$FILElrothePointCC0386_RegulationSKStudy_2January2014.pdf
416. Stein Remarks, supra note 409.
417. Manny Cohen, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the 19th Annual Confer
ence of the Financial Analysts Federation (May 24, 1966).
418. See Higgins, Disclosure Effectiveness, supra note 8.
419. See id.
420. Stein Remarks, supra note 409.
421. Higgins, Shaping Company Disclosure, supra note 394.
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form of potential flexibility can be afforded by the adoption of a "company file"
procedure, which would allow companies to update information on the same
time schedule required for filings. This company file could be organized into
tabs, accessible through the company page on sec.gov, including "Business Infor-
mation," "Financial Information," and "Governance Information. " 422
Director Higgins has asserted that investors perspectives must be represented
in determining disclosure requirements, but "for investors with voracious appe-
tites for information, the need for company disclosures can be boundless."423
Accordingly, balance must come into play and the SEC must consider "the com-
pliance costs for companies and the potential impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation."424
Many of these ideas have been introduced in a recently published mammoth
concept release on Regulation S-K, which is likely to dominate further discussion
of the SEC's disclosure reform project.425 Among many other requests for com-
ments are inquiries as to whether a principles-based disclosure system should
change traditional concepts of materiality. Yet, it will take some convincing for
companies to gamble with the timing of the offering or their legal liability by ex-
perimenting with disclosure and not disclosing items that may be material.
Professor Tom Lin has contributed to the conversation regarding the need for
better disclosure by noting that the emergence of computerized trading has made
obsolete the reasonable investor standard, which was long embraced by the
Commission and courts alike. 426 He notes that the modern reasonable investor
is often not a reasonable person at all but computerized artificial intelligence that
suggests and places trades based on complex algorithmic functions. 427 Reliance
on algorithmic investment management is widespread- almost every entity inves-
tor with significant assets under management uses advanced technological
programs to manage investment portfolios. 42' Not only has this evolution signif-
icantly expedited the trading process, reducing the average time spent contem-
plating a trade from days to seconds, but this adaptation has greatly skewed the
playing field in favor of investors who can afford cutting-edge trading technol-
ogy.429 The advantages offered by advanced trading technology are considerable-
investors may access far greater amounts of information and, more importantly,
reduce latency on trade executions. It has been demonstrated that "investors
with more resources can regularly outperform other investors in the marketplace
without such technology. " 4 3 0 In short, Lin argues that reasonable investors are
no longer succeeding in accordance with their skill but rather in accordance
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Concept Release, Securities Act Release No. 10064, 81 Fed. Reg. (Apr. 22 2016).
426. See Tom CW. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. Rv. 461, 508-09 (2015).
427. Id. at 495.
428. Id. at 501 (citing Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing oj Financial
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with their means.431 Similarly, the reasonableness of trades is no longer based on
human rationalization but is rather dictated by digital automation. 432 This mod-
ern reality erodes many of the critical assumptions upon which the Securities
Act's disclosure requirements have been founded.
Another challenge to the current disclosure model is posed by Professor Henry
Hu, who believes that stock issuers disclose information to investors in a manner
that offers only distorted and coarse depictions of reality. The issuer, Hu argues,
may distort reality by furnishing biased characterizations of raw information for
investors. 4 3 3 This distortion, however, is not necessarily intentional. Hu argues
that "it can be difficult for even the most well-intentioned of intermediaries to
craft good depictions of reality, especially when that reality is highly com-
plex. " 4 34 Part of this difficulty can be attributed to shortcomings in the depiction
tools themselves, offering the means to develop only "coarse outlines of the
[complex] objective reality."4 3' Another obstacle that issuers face in providing
objectively accurate disclosures lies in their fully comprehending objective real-
ity. Hu notes that misunderstandings naturally flow from financial complexities,
which can inadvertently distort the disclosures offered to investors. 436 To elim-
inate these distortions, Hu suggests a "pure information" approach whereby is-
suers offer investors raw data from which investors may draw their own objective
conclusions. 4 3 7 This approach ultimately removes any distorting gloss the issuer
intentionally or unintentionally places over disclosures.
Professor Hu also has analyzed the problems with SEC requirements for dis-
closure by banks in light of competing disclosure requirements now imposed by
the bank regulators, which are more interested in the well-being of individual
banks and the stability of the financial system than in investor protection. 438
In view of these overlapping requirements, Hu argues that bank disclosure doc-
uments are unduly prolix yet opaque. 4 3 9 Further, the SEC's Bank Industry
Guide, which dates back to 1976, is quite antiquated.
Professors Langevoort and Thompson have suggested that more stringent dis-
closure requirements should be imposed on public offerings than on annual re-
porting because of the selling efforts associated with public offerings. 441 Such a
regime would, however, take securities regulation back to the long-criticized
problems of disparate disclosure that led to the SEC's integrated disclosure rule-
making initiatives in the early 1980s. These academics have also suggested that
for purposes of Exchange Act registration and reporting, average daily trading
431. Id.
432. Id. at 496.
433. Hu, Too Complex, supra note 14, at 1601.
434. Id. at 1608.
435. Id. at 1609.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1611.
438. Hu, Disclosure Universes, supra note 9, at 569.
439. Id. at 571.
440. Id. at 590-92.
441. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 70.
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volume is a better metric than number of shareholders of record.442 Langevoort
and Thompson characterize the requisite number of shareholders for "public-
ness" under the JOBS Act as arbitrary and believe that the line between public
and private companies is better drawn using trading activity rather than investor
subscription as the defining metric. 44 3 They also recognize that some of the dis-
closure obligations placed on large public companies have an impact on constit-
uencies beyond investors, and that these other constituencies are demanding
greater transparency from issuers. The extent to which "securities regulation is
about social, political, and economic interests, in addition to investor protection
and capital formation, has been seriously underestimated. '444 To claim that the
sustainable disclosure movement is limited to investor protection may be polit-
ically persuasive, but is nevertheless disingenuous. 44  Moreover, as demon-
strated by the conflict minerals story, requiring public companies to make dis-
closures in SEC documents for reasons other than investor protection is a
convenient hook for reformers.
Reconciling the different pressures for disclosure reform being exerted on the
SEC may require differentiating between large public companies, especially multi-
nationals, and other companies that have tapped the capital markets but have a
more limited footprint. Size and trading volume are probably better metrics in
this regard than number of shareholders, but other possible lenses have been
suggested. Professor Dombalagian has argued that regulatory privileges and ob-
ligations under the securities laws should be parceled out depending upon suit-
ability, efficiency, and representativeness. 446 He envisions tiers of companies
subject to different disclosure requirements, depending upon whether nonac-
credited investors are shareholders, whether there is an efficient exchange or
similar market for the pricing of an issuer's securities, and whether an issuer's
stock is included in recognized indices. 44 Professor Dombalagian recognizes
that large public corporations may maintain relationships with many constituen-
cies beyond shareholders so extensively "that their corporate decision making
may reverberate throughout the national and international economy."448 Accord-
ingly, SEC disclosure is a handy tool for corporate social responsibility advocates.
Professor Guttentag also recommends a tiered disclosure regime whereby
companies that have a market capitalization of less than $35 million or fewer
than 100 beneficial shareholders would have an automatic exemption from
full disclosure mandates .44 Larger firms could opt into another regime if they
442. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 70, at 360.
443. Id. at 338.
444. Id. at 372-33.
445. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Trans-
parency, 112 HARV. L. Rv. 1197 (1999); see also Hilary Sale, The New "Public" Corporation, 74 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011).
446. Dombalagian, supra note 10, at 653.
447. Id. at 698-99.
448. Id. at 666.
449. See Guttentag, supra note 10, at 156-57.
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are willing to restrict the liquidity of their stock trading, and the biggest public
companies would be required to comply with the full panoply of SEC disclosure
mandates. 4
One idea for putting tiered disclosure in place is to look at the capitalization
and impact of public companies in the capital markets. Another route would be
to require new sustainability disclosures to be furnished to the SEC and made
available to interested investors and others but not require that such disclosures
be filed. Limiting the liability of companies for such disclosures, similar to what
was accomplished in Regulation FD, would be helpful in mitigating the push-
back from business groups with respect to such disclosures. 451 In connection
with the SEC's promulgation of rules with regard to resource extraction, business
interests argued that their reports should be furnished to the SEC but not made
public, and the D.C. Circuit agreed that Dodd-Frank permits that approach .452
Yet, if reports on any subject are filed in such a confidential manner with the
SEC, they certainly cannot be justified in the name of investor protection. Nev-
ertheless, the D.C. Circuit suggested the SEC could aggregate the information in-
cluded in the individual reports and release a consolidated summary of the data
to the public .
4 5
At one time, corporations received charters from legislatures and were viewed
as public agencies with limited franchises and public responsibilities. 4 54 Free in-
corporation changed this paradigm, 4 5 5 but even as late as the 1930s, when the
securities laws were passed, it was argued that when a company taps the public
for capital it becomes a public body with obligations to its shareholders. 456 The
free market ideologies of the late twentieth century, particularly the law and eco-
nomics movement, challenged such ideas and argued that corporations should
be able to operate free of many legal constraints because the market would im-
pose optimum disclosure and other standards. 4 5 7 Disillusion with such ideas set
in after the financial market meltdown of 2008, but Dodd-Frank simply imposed
a plethora of command and control (and exceedingly expensive) regulations on
large public companies (especially financial institutions) without any serious re-
thinking, beyond preventing systemic risk, of the investor protection mantra.
In the 1980s, in response to the merger and takeover activities of that period,
the stakeholder model held out a promise of a new idea of corporate responsi-
bility, but stakeholder statutes were invoked primarily by managers who were
attempting to fend off hostile takeovers. In today's world, it is important to
think of some new corporate and securities principles for holding large corpora-
tions responsible beyond the narrow view of investor protection measured by
450. See id.
451. See Regulation FD, Rule 102, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2015).
452. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
453. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 15 (D.D.C. 2013).
454. See PHILIP BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 6 (1993).
455. Id. at 22.
456. See Hu, Too Complex, supra note 14, at 1615-16.
457. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection oj In-
vestors, 70 VA. L. RE. 669 (1984); RIcHARD A. POSNR, A FAILURE O CAPITALISM 70 (2009).
Disclosure Reform 833
share price. Otherwise, more and more obligations, including disclosure obliga-
tions, will be placed on such companies by legislative fiat. Nevertheless, it does
not make sense to place the responsibility for enforcing sustainability and other
social responsibility goals upon the SEC in the name of investor protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congressional use of the federal securities law to compel disclosure of social
and political goals is likely to continue. In at least one instance, Congress dis-
pensed with the need for SEC rulemaking when it directly compelled public
companies to report on their dealings with Iran.458 Yet, others in Congress
and on the Commission itself are opposed to using disclosure policy under
the federal securities laws for purposes other than investor protection. Such
an adversarial and partisan battle puts the SEC in a difficult position. It is there-
fore unlikely that disclosure reform will move beyond incremental changes ei-
ther in the direction of additional requirements for social and political disclo-
sures that are not related to metrics of financial materiality or in the direction
of simplifying existing mandates in Regulations S-K and S-X.
Despite the impetus to reduce disclosure burdens and simplify disclosure, the
movement for standards of sustainability and their disclosure in SEC documents
seems to have gathered some traction, and there probably will be continuing
pressure on the SEC to recognize or adopt some of the standards the SASB
has set. Even if the Commission does not recognize SASB standards in the
same way it has recognized FASB standards, these standards will influence
many public companies' disclosures.
One way in which the SEC could deal with the conflicting pressures to compel
companies to disclose more with regard to SASB standards and similar social and
political matters without further complicating disclosure documents would be to
follow the approach of the conflict minerals rule. That is, the SEC could require
companies to file (or furnish) information about various matters on the agenda of
social and political interest groups in side filings, rather than putting such infor-
mation in a company's annual report or other periodic filings or offering docu-
ments. Further, if such information did not give rise to issuer liability under the
antifraud rules, there might not be so much pushback against such new require-
ments. Yet, if the SEC must produce a cost-benefit analysis for the promulgation
of new disclosure rules, the agency might be hard pressed to determine the ben-
efits against great costs unless Congress mandates the disclosures. Whether Con-
gress will do so probably depends upon the political composition of future
Congresses. The SEC also will be undoubtedly influenced by the final outcome
of the ongoing litigation with respect to the new conflict minerals and resource
extraction rules in the courts.
458. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 219(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)
(2012); see Yin Wilczek, Ex-SEC Official: Stay Tuned jor Congress to Require More Social, Political Dis-
closures, 46 SEc REG. & L. RP. (BNA) 1638, 1639 (Sept. 16, 2013).
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Another possible route the SEC might take in reconciling the various demands
for disclosure reform would be to tier public companies for purposes of Ex-
change Act reporting in the same way in which it has tiered companies under
the Securities Act to allow WKSIs to tap the capital markets without complying
with all of the regulations applicable to issuers engaging in first-time public of-
ferings. The SEC will have to do so to some extent to comply with rulemaking
under the JOBS Act and could take further steps in this direction. In so doing,
the SEC should find a more satisfactory metric than number of record sharehold-
ers in distinguishing between large and small public companies. Some of the
ideas this article discusses, such as market capitalization, would be a good
place to start. Other possible metrics would be balance sheet assets, number
of employees, number of countries in which the issuer does business, and
good or bad citizenship record based on citations by other regulatory agencies
or criminal prosecutions by state and federal regulators. Nevertheless, the SEC
should not be put in the position of enforcing other regulatory statutes such
as the NEPA.
Although any of the SEC's efforts to require disclosure obligations beyond an
investor protection materiality standard on Exchange Act reporting companies
will be met with criticism, the EU has essentially already done so. In order to
protect and assist U.S. companies that are complying with the new EU sustain-
ability standards, the demands being made for cybersecurity compliance and dis-
closures to customers, climate change inquiries, and other social responsibility
issues, it will be difficult if not impossible for the SEC to avoid wading further
into the swamp of disclosures relating to social and political issues.
Yet, simply adding more and more disclosure requirements to Regulation S-K
cannot be the right answer to responding to the pressure for political and sus-
tainability disclosures and greater accountability and transparency by public
companies. Also, in responding to the pressures by start-ups for the ability to
raise capital without complying with traditional disclosure requirements, Con-
gress and the SEC must avoid being blinded by the romance of entrepreneurship
in crafting exemptions that may provide opportunities for widespread fraud.
SEC disclosure policy is based on valid historical experience. The Commission
needs to resist both undue path dependency and unwarranted experimentation.
